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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER
SOFTWARE IN THE NINETIES
I. INTRODUCTION
This article opens with a review of the historical development
of copyright law as it relates to computer software. Procedures for
securing a copyright are then discussed, as well as the requirements
for registering that copyright. Attention is then turned to recent
developments in copyright law impacting those in the software in-
dustry, including issues of copyright ownership, infringement, va-
lidity, and enforceability; recordation of security interests; software
rental prohibitions; and the validity of shrink wrap licenses. The
objectives of this analysis are simple: (1) To provide an overview of
important copyright issues for consideration by those in the
software industry, and to raise the priority given to such matters;
and (2) to demonstrate why one must constantly reevaluate internal
policies and practices in light of the rapidly changing rules gov-
erning copyright protection for computer programs. Ultimately
this analysis should educate the reader in contemporary issues of
software copyright protection that need to be addressed in order to
maximize the value of one's own copyrights, while minimizing the
risk that one's products will run afoul of the copyrights of others.
II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to promote
the progress of science by securing for limited times to authors the
exclusive right to their writings.' Exercising that power, Congress
enacted the Copyright Act of 19092 which provided protection for
"all the writings of an author"3 including books.' In 1964, the
Copyright Office announced that it would register claims to copy-
right in computer programs under the 1909 Act as "books".5 From
1964 to 1977, copyright claims in less than 2000 programs were
registered.6 The 1909 Act was superseded by the Copyright Act of
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
2. This statute is hereinafter referred to as "the 1909 Act" or "the Act of 1909". The
1909 Act, as last amended in 1974, is reproduced in M.B. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, Appendix 6 (1990 ed.) [hereinafter NIMMER].
3. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1974).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 5(a) (1974).
5. NiMMER, supra note 2, § 2.04[C], at 2-46 n.27.
6. A. J. Levine, History of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, paper
presented at The 1991 Pacific Rim Computer Law Conference in Newport Beach, California.
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1976, which became effective on January 1, 1978.' . The 1976 Act
provided protection for "original works of authorship fixed in a tan-
gible medium of expression"'  including "literary works."9  The
Legislative History of the 1976 Act explains that copyright protec-
tion for computer programs existed under the 1909 Act,10 as would
also be the case under the new Act since the term "literary works"
includes "computer data bases, and computer programs .... 11
While computer programs were copyrightable material under
both the 1909 and 1976 Acts, it was not clear to what extent, if any,
the copyright owner could exclude others from using them in a
computer-that is, pursue "an action for infringement... by means
of a computer."' 2 Congress could have tackled that thorny issue in
the 1976 Act. Instead, Congress included a statement in § 117 of
the new Act that whatever the law had been it would continue to
be, without ever stating what the law had been.'" Congress said
that "it would be premature to change existing law on computer
uses at present" since a commission, appointed by Congress to
study the issue and recommend changes was, "now engaged in mak-
ing a thorough study of emerging patterns in this field."' 4 The
commission, established by Congress on the last day of 1974, was
called the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works ("CONTU").' 5
7. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2598 (1976) (enacted October 19, 1976, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1978, codified as 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.) [hereinafter "the 1976 Act", "the Act of
1976" or "the new Act"]. The 1976 Act, as amended in November 1988, is reproduced in
NIMMER, supra note 2, at Appendix 2.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(1) (1976).
10. H. L. REP No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 51 (1976) (comments on 17 U.S.C.
§ 102) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] reprinted in NIMMER, supra note 2, at Appendix 4.
11. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 54 (comments on 17 U.S.C. § 102) (the quoted
passage continues "to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's ex-
pression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves"). Also see HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 10, at 116 (comments on 17 U.S.C. § 117) ("With respect to the
copyrightability of computer programs, the ownership of copyrights in them, the term of
protection, and the formal requirements of the remainder of the bill, the new statute would
apply.").
12. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 116 (comments on 17 U.S.C. § 117).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976) stated: "this title does not afford to the owner of copyright
in a work any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with
automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information, or in
conjunction with any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded to works under
the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31,
1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under this title."
14. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 116 (comments on 17 U.S.C. § 117).
15. Pub. L. No. 93-573, 93rd Congress, S. 3976, December 31, 1974, reprinted in NIM-
MER, supra note 2, at Appendix 19 (CONTU's charter was in part "to study and compile data
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In 1980, Congress amended the 1976 Act consistent with rec-
ommendations made in CONTU's Final Report of July 1978.16
The term "computer program" was defined as "a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result."17 Section 117 was also
amended to provide that it was not an infringement for the "owner
of a copy" of another's copyrighted computer program to make a
copy or adaptation of the program "as an essential step in the utili-
zation of the computer program in conjunction with a machine" or
"for archival purposes."18 Thus, CONTU's recommendations, and
the amendments adopted therefrom, provided no guidance as to the
scope of copyright protection to be given computer programs (that
is, what would constitute infringement of a computer program
copyright). That was left to the courts. A fortiori, one must turn to
the cases decided after the 1980 amendments to determine the scope
of protection now afforded to computer programs in the United
States.19
on ... the reproduction and use of copyrighted works of authorship... in conjunction with
automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, and transferring information"
and to "make recommendations as to such changes in copyright law or procedures that may
be necessary to assure for such purposes access to copyrighted works, and to provide recogni-
tion of the rights of copyright owners.").
16. The CONTU Final Report (also referred to herein as "the CONTU Report" or
"the Report"), is reproduced in C.H. SHERMAN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION LAW,
Appendix A (1990 ed.).
17. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028, (1980) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 101) [hereinafter "1980 Amendments"]. The 1980 Amendments are reflected in
NIMMER, supra note 2, at Appendix 2, which contains a reproduction of the 1976 Act, as
amended in November 1988.
18. The 1980 Amendments, § 10(a), codified as 17 U.S.C. § 117, provide:
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it
is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the com-
puter program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section
may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which
such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all
rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with
the authorization of the copyright owner.
19. Notwithstanding that copyright registration of computer programs began back in
1964, case law addressing the scope of copyright protection did not truly begin to develop
until after the 1980 Amendments. See NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.04[C], at 2-46 n.27. It has
been said that "the copyrightability of computer programs is firmly established after the 1980
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III. SECURING A COPYRIGHT AND OBTAINING A
REGISTRATION
A. Securing A Copyright
Under the 1976 Act, "Copyright protection subsists . . . in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device", including literary works
and audiovisual works.20 Thus, copyright protection begins when
the work is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression"21 (e.g.,
Amendment to the Copyright Act." Williams Elecs., v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875,
215 U.S.P.Q. 405 (3rd Cir. 1982).
In evaluating the scope of computer program copyright protection, the courts would
have the benefit of CONTU's Final Report which discusses that issue as well as many others.
However, some courts have refused to rely on the Report except to "help to explain the
context in which Congress acted" on the theory that Congress adopted the two short recom-
mendations of CONTU, not the entire report. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l,
740 F. Supp. 37, 54, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577, 1588 (D. Mass. 1990) ("CONTU, of course, was
not an official voice of Congress, and its views are not, without more, attributable to Con-
gress. Thus, courts must not treat the CONTU report as legislative history, in the ordinary
sense, much less as an authoritative statement about manifested legislative intent." The
Court did believe, however, that Congress followed the CONTU Final Report and, therefore,
"the express views of the Commission, to the extent not repudiated by the Congress, may
help to explain the context in which Congress acted, which in turn may support inferences
about the meaning of any otherwise ambiguous passages in which Congress declared.").
Other courts have relied on the CONTU Final Report only as to statements relating to
the amended provisions of the 1976 Act. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d
1222, 1241, 230 U.S.P.Q. 481 (3rd Cir. 1986) (the CONTU Report was considered a "surro-
gate legislative history" in construing the 1980 amendments to the copyright law; but the
Court also said "the CONTU Report has force only insofar as it can be said to represent the
will of Congress" and "there is no sense in which it represents the will of Congress with
respect to provisions not amended in response to the report.").
Still other courts have heavily relied on the CONTU Final Report "as accepted by Con-
gress" even though that position seems totally at odds with the facts. Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252, 219 U.S.P.Q. 113 (3rd Cir. 1983) ("We
can consider the CONTU Report as accepted by Congress since Congress wrote into the law
the majority's recommendations almost verbatim.").
Hereinafter the terms "the 1976 Act", "the Act of 1976" or "the new Act," refer to the
statute as last amended and reproduced in NIMMER, supra note 2, at Appendix 2. All future
references to 17 U.S.C. § -, refer to the statute as last amended.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1),(a)(6) (1976). Literary works are defined in the 1976 Act as
"works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or nu-
merical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books,
periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embod-
ied." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Audiovisual works are defined as "works that consist of a series of
related images, which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices
such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if
any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the
works are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
21. The 1976 Act provides that "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression
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written on paper) and thereby "created". 22 Nothing more is re-
quired. For example, placement of a copyright notice on copies of a
work is no longer necessary to create or protect the copyright in the
work, though it is recommended.23 Similarly, obtaining a certificate
of copyright registration from the U.S. Copyright Office is not nec-
essary to create or protect the copyright in a work, though registra-
tion may be a prerequisite to filing suit,24 and early registration may
constitute prima facie evidence of copyright validity should the
copyright owner sue for infringement,25 and early registration may
also be required for recovery of attorneys' fees and liquidated dam-
ages should the claimant prevail in an infringement action.26 The
when its embodiment in a copy. . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory dura-
tion." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
22. A work is created when "it is fixed in a copy ... for the first time. . ." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101. The term copies is defined in the 1976 Act as "material objects, other than pho-
norecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
23. Omission of copyright notice on copies of a work distributed after the effective date
of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (March 1, 1989) does not result in
forfeiture of copyrights in the work. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a). The Berne Convention is a conven-
tion for the protection of literary and artistic works originally signed in Berne, Switzerland on
September 9, 1886. The U.S. recently became a signatory to the Berne Convention and Con-
gress passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (effective March 1, 1989)
which made changes to the 1976 Act in order to comply with the requirements of the Berne
Convention. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (October 31, 1988). The Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988 is reproduced in NIMMER, supra note 2, Appendix 2A.
Most copyright practitioners continue to recommend the use of copyright notice. The
recommended format for a proper copyright notice is: C in a circle or the word Copyright or
the abbreviation Copyr. followed by the year of first publication (or the date the work was
created) followed by the name of the copyright owner and the phrase ALL RIGHTS RE-
SERVED. See 17 U.S.C. § 401(b). It is also recommended that the notice appear at the
beginning or end of the program so that it is easily seen when the program is printed; and on
the initial display screen when the program is loaded; and on the media on which the pro-
gram is placed (e.g., diskette; ROM; CDROM; etc.); and on any container or package in
which the program is sold (e.g., box). See 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(g) (1990) (37 C.F.R. §§ 201 et
seq., which are the Copyright Regulations promulgated under the 1976 Act, are reproduced
in Appendix 3 of NIMMER, supra note 2).
24. Except for certain works having a country of origin outside the U.S., registration is
a prerequisite to filing an infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). The only works excluded
are Berne Convention works having a country of origin outside the U.S.; both quoted terms
are defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101.
25. Registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work
constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and the facts stated in the
certificate. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). The term publication is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 as "the
distribution of copies... of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending" and "offering to distribute copies to a group of persons for purposes
of further distribution ...."
26. Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) & (b), in an action for copyright infringement, the
copyright owner may recover his actual damages suffered as a result of the infringement, and
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copyright owner is granted certain exclusive rights, including the
exclusive right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies";27 "to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work";28 "to
distribute copies... of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending";29 and to
import copies of the copyrighted work into the United States.3"
B. Obtaining A Certificate Of Copyright Registration
Pursuant to its authority under 17 U.S.C. § 408(c), the Regis-
ter of Copyrights has promulgated regulations, 37 C.F.R. § 202 et
seq., prescribing the requirements for securing a certificate of copy-
right registration. Generally, definitions in § 101 of the 1976 Act
apply to like terms in the regulations.31 For the purpose of registra-
tion, the regulations prescribe four classes of work.32 The class most
applicable to computer programs being "Class TX" for "non-dra-
matic literary works,"' 33 together with an application form for each
class and the form being "Form TX."'3 The application for a cer-
tificate of copyright registration must include the Form TX fully
completed, including the certification at the end thereof, an applica-
tion fee (now $20.00), a deposit of identifying portions of the pro-
gram (discussed below) 35 with the position of the copyright notice,
the infringer's profits attributable to the infringement and not taken into account in determin-
ing actual damages. Alternatively, under 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2) & (c) the copyright owner
can recover fixed, liquidated damages called statutory damages which is particularly advanta-
geous when he cannot prove substantial actual damages or profits by the infringer. Under 17
U.S.C. § 505 the court has discretion to award a copyright owner his reasonable attorneys'
fees should he prevail in the litigation. However, 17 U.S.C. § 412 provides that no award of
statutory damages or attorneys' fees is allowed: (1) for infringement of copyright in an unpub-
lished work if the infringement commenced before the effective date of its registration; or (2)
for infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and before the
effective date of its registration, unless registration is made within three months after the first
publication of the work.
27. The definition of copies under the 1976 Act is set out in supra note 22.
28. The term derivative work is defined in the 1976 Act as "a work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as a translation... or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a).
31. See 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(b)(1), § 202.3(a)(2), § 202.20(b)(3) (1990).
32. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(1) (1990).
33. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(I)(i)(1990).
34. 37 C.F.R § 202.3(b)(2) (1990).
35. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(c) (1990); 37 CFR § 202.3(b)(4)(ii)(A)-(C) (1990)
(group registrations of databases). Note should be made that the Register of Copyrights may
grant an applicant "special relief" from the deposit requirement when it believes such is
warranted. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(d) (1990).
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if any, clearly shown. 36 The general rule is that only one registra-
tion for each version of a work is required. 7 However, there are
exceptions, one of which is that "[s]upplemental registrations may
be made.., to correct or amplify the information in a [prior] regis-
tration ....3
According to the Copyright Office, "all copyrightable expres-
sion in a single work owned by the same claimant and embodied in
a computer program, or first published as a unit with a computer
program, including computer screen displays, is considered a single
work and should be registered on a single application form."
39
That is consistent with the general rules for registration of the pro-
tected elements of any other work.' ° It is also consistent with case
law. For example, in GCA Corp. v. Chance,41 the court held that
plaintiff's registration on the source code of its program was ade-
quate to support a suit for infringement based on copying of the
object code by a defendant not having access to the source code:
"Because the object code is the encryption of the copyrighted
source code, the two are to be treated as one work; therefore, copy-
right [registration] of the source code protects the object code as
well."'42 Similarly, in M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, the court
held that since a computer program in a ROM is the fixation of
(and thus a copy of) a video game for which plaintiff obtained an
audiovisual copyright, "[a] copyright in the audiovisual display,
which display is created by a computer program, protects not only
the audiovisual from copying, but also the underlying computer
program to the extent the program embodies the game's
expression."'4
Furthermore, recent amendments to the Copyright Regula-
tions provide that whenever certain very precise conditions are met,
"a single [group] registration may be made for automated databases
and their updates or other derivative versions that are original
works of authorship ... [which are either] unpublished ... [or]
36. 37 C.F.R. § 202.21(e) (1990). Where the copyright notice is not otherwise appar-
ent, it should be pointed out and reproduced in a cover letter or otherwise.
37. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(6) (1990).
38. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(6)(iv) (1990). The requirements for filing a supplemental re-
gistration are set out in 37 C.F.R. § 201.5 (1990).
39. 36 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.(BNA) No. 884 at 152-55 (June 9, 1988).
40. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(3) and (6) (1990).
41. 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
42. Id at 720.
43. 783 F.2d 421, 442, 228 U.S.P.Q. 705 (4th Cir. 1986).
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published only in the form of machine-readable copies."'
1. Deposit
17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1) authorizes the Register of Copyrights to
specify by regulation the administrative classes into which works
are to be placed for purposes of deposit and registration, and the
nature of the copies to be deposited in the various classes specified.
Under that authority, the Register of Copyrights promulgated 37
C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii) which is directed to "computer pro-
grams" and "databases" which are either unpublished or published
only in machine-readable copies (e.g., magnetic tape or disks,
punched cards, semiconductor chip products, and the like).45
a. Computer Programs
As to computer programs, the deposit shall be on paper or mi-
44. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4)(i) (1990). The conditions, set out in 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.3(b)(4)(i)(A)-(G), include:
(A) All of the updates or other revisions are owned by the same copyright
claimant;
(B) All of the updates or other revisions have the same general title;
(C) All of the updates or other revisions are similar in their general content,
including their subject;
(D) All of the updates or other revisions are similar in their organization;
(E) Each of the updates or other revisions as a whole, if published before
March 1, 1989, bears a statutory copyright notice as first published and the
name of the owner of copyright in each work (or an abbreviation by which the
name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the
owner) was the same in each notice;
(F) Each of the updates or other revisions if published was first published, or if
unpublished was first created, within a three-month period in a single calendar
year;, and
(G) The deposit accompanying the application complies with
§ 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(B).
45. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii) (1990) which provides that "[i]n cases where a com-
puter program, database.... if unpublished is fixed, or if published is published only in the
form of machine-readable copies (such as magnetic tape or disks, punched cards, semicon-
ductor chip products, or the like, from which the work cannot ordinarily be perceived except
with the aid of a machine or device, the deposit shall consist of:. . ." 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.20(c)(2)(ix) (1990) provides that "where a published literary work is embodied in cop-
ies containing both visually-perceptible and machine-readable material, the deposit shall con-
sist of the visually-perceptible material and identifying portions of the machine-readably
material." The term publication is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 as "the distribution of copies
... of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending" and "offering to distribute copies to a group of persons for purposes of further distri-
bution ......
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crofilm" and shall consist of the page containing the copyright no-
tice, if any, plus one copy of the first and last 25 pages of source
code.47 If the source code is 50 pages or less, all the source code is
to be deposited.48 However, if the program is a revised version but
the revisions do not occur throughout the program, that is, the revi-
sions will not be reflected in the first and last 25 pages, the deposit
should be of 50 pages representative of the revised material.4 9
Since materials deposited with the Copyright Office are avail-
able to the public for inspection,"0 when the program contains trade
secret material, the deposit copy may be the page with the copyright
notice plus either: (1) the first and last 25 pages of source code (or,
if the source code is 25 pages or less, the entire source code) with
the trade secret material blocked out; (2) the first and last 10 pages
of source code; or (3) the first and last 25 pages of object code and
any consecutive 10 pages of source code. 1 Alternatively, if the pro-
gram is a revised version but the revisions do not occur throughout
the program, that is, the revisions will not be reflected in the first
and last 25 pages, the deposit should be of (1) 20 pages of source
code representative of the revised material, or (2) 50 pages of source
code representative of the revised material with portions of the
source code containing trade secrets blocked out. 2
Where object code is deposited, the certificate of registration
will be issued under the Copyright Offices Rule of Doubt which
"warns that no determination has been made concerning the exist-
ence of copyrightable authorship" since the Office cannot know that
what is in fact deposited is a computer program. 3 This Rule of
Doubt sounds worse than it is. What you deposit will presumably
be a computer program and an infringing defendant will have a near
impossible time proving otherwise at trial. Indeed, the author is
aware of no case in which a Rule of Doubt registration played a
significant role in a court's analysis of the validity of the copyright
registration.
46. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A) (1990).
47. 37 C.F.R § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A)(1) (1990).
48. 37 C.F.RL § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A)(1) (1990).
49. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A)(1) (1990).
50. 37 C.F.R § 201.2(b) (1990).
51. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A)(2) (1990).
52. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A)(2) (1990). Blocking out of trade secret material is
never permissible, however, unless the blocked-out portions are proportionately less than the
remaining portions which includes an appreciable amount of original computer code.
53. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(B) (1990).
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b. Computer Program Generated Display Screens
Where the application to claim copyright in a computer pro-
gram includes a specific claim in related computer screen displays,
the deposit must also include a visual reproduction of the copyright-
able expression in the form of printouts, photographs or drawings
no smaller than 3"x 3" and no larger than 9"x 12".14 However, if
the authorship of the work is predominantly audiovisual and the
computer screen material is more than simply a demonstration of
the functioning of the computer program, a one-half inch VHS for-
mat videotape reproducing the copyrightable expression is re-
quired."5 This latter provision is directed to game software where
the display screen output is a continuously changing audiovisual
work, 6 rather than conventional applications software where the
display screen output is generally a group of still screens.
c. Databases
As to databases (and other computerized information works
such as compilations, statistical compendia and the like), the de-
posit shall be on paper or microfilm57 and shall consist of the first
and last 25 pages.58 However, if the work is an automated database
comprising multiple separate or distinct data files, 9 the deposit
should be 50 complete data records from each data file or the entire
data file, whichever is less, plus a certain descriptive statement.' If
the author is seeking an individual registration of a revised (up-
54. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(C)(1) (1990).
55. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(CX(2) (1990).
56. Audiovisual works are defined as "works which consist of a series of related images,
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projec-
tors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless
of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embod-
ied." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
57. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(D) (1990).
58. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(D)(1) (1990).
59. A data file is defined as "a group of data records pertaining to a common subject
matter regardless of their size or the number of data items in them." 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(D)(2) (1990).
60. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(D)(4) (1990). The descriptive statement must include
information about use of proper copyright notice (§ 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(D)(6)-(7)), as well as the
following (37 C.F.R. § 202(c)(2)(vii)(B)(5)):
(i) The title of the database;
(ii) A subtitle, date of creation or publication, or other information, to distin-
guish any separate or distinct data files for cataloging purposes;
(iii) The name and address of the copyright claimant;
(iv) For each separate file, its name and content, including its subject, the ori-
gin(s) of the data, and the approximate number of data records it contains;
and...
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dated) version of the work, the deposit requirement is 50 represen-
tative pages or data records which have been added or modified.6"
However, if the author is seeking a group registration for a revised
(updated) version of the work, the deposit requirement is 50 repre-
sentative pages or data records which have been added or modified
on one representative publication date for published works or on
one representative creation date for unpublished works, plus a cer-
tain descriptive statement about the database.62
IV. OWNERSHIP ISSUES
A. Ownership of Copyright
Section 201(a) of the 1976 Act provides that copyright owner-
ship vests initially in the author(s) of the work. A transfer of own-
ership from the author generally requires a writing signed by the
author conveying such rights to the transferee.63 It therefore is
quite important to identify the author of the work.
1. Work Made For Hire
"As a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates
the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed,
tangible expression entitled to copyright protection."'6  However,
an important exception is provided in § 201(b). If a work is a 'work
made for hire,' "the employer or other person for whom the work
was prepared is considered the author" and owns the copyright ab-
sent a written agreement to the contrary.65  In the computer
software field where it is common for a company to engage outside
programmers to write code for a given project, the 'work made for
hire' concept "carr[ies] profound significance. ' 66
There are two types of arrangements which may constitute a
'work made for hire.' The first, set out in § 101(2) of the 1976 Act,
61. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(D)(3) (1990).
62. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(D)(5) (1990). The descriptive statement is described
in endnote 61, except the statement would also need to include (37 C.F.R.
§ 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(D)(5)):
(v) In the case of revised or updated versions of an automated database, infor-
mation as to the nature and frequency of changes in the database and
some identification of the location within the database or the separate data
files of the revisions.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). The exception is a transfer by operation of law, such as where
rights in the work are subject to state community property laws.
64. Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2166,
104 L.Ed.2d 811, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1985 (1989) [hereinafter CCNV].
65. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b); CCNV, 490 U.S. at 737.
66. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 737.
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provides that a 'work made for hire' is "a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use" in certain, very specific categories of copy-
righted works "if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire." This class is not typically involved in the computer program
context because the enumerated categories of works do not gener-
ally apply to computer programs.67
The second type of 'work made for hire', set out in § 101(1) of
the 1976 Act, provides that a 'work made for hire' is "a work pre-
pared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment."
Until recently, courts applied inconsistent tests for determining
whether the work was prepared by an "employee within the scope
of his or her employment." For example, courts held that a work
was considered to have been prepared by an "employee within the
scope of his or her employment" when the hiring party "retains the
right" to control the creation of the work, when the hiring party
"actually wielded control" over creation of the work, when the per-
son creating the work was an employee under the "common law of
agency", or when the person creating the work was a "formal, sala-
ried employee." 6
In CCNV, the Supreme Court resolved the issue, holding that
"a work [was] prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment," and, thus a 'work made for hire,' when the crea-
tor of the work was an employee under the general common law of
agency.69 The Court made clear that the term 'general common
law' meant the "federal rule of agency, rather than.., state agency
law ... given the Act's express objective of creating national uni-
form copyright law."' 70 The Court set out a non-exhaustive list of
67. The categories are "a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribu-
tion to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a transla-
tion, as supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed
by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire." It generally would not
cover a computer program work, though it might in the case of things such as a translation
(e.g., rewriting a computer program into another computer language), or the audiovisual
work generated by a computer program (e.g., displays of a video game). If a work does not
fall within one of the enumerated categories, it simply cannot qualify as a "work made for
hire" under § 101(2). NIMMER, supra note 2, § 5.03[B][2][a], at 5-31 and cases cited therein
at note 119; also see CCNV, 490 U.S. at 738 ("Sculpture does not fit within any of the nine
categories of 'specially commissioned' works enumerated in that subsection, and no written
agreement between the parties establishes Third World America as a work for hire.").
68. See CCNV, 490 U.S. at 739-40 (describing these four separate interpretations ap-
plied by the courts).
69. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751.
70. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 740-41.
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factors to be considered which included the hiring party's right to
control creation of the work, the skill required by the party creating
the work, which party supplied the things used to create the work,
at which party's location the work was created, the duration of the
relationship between the parties, whether the hiring party has the
right to assign additional projects to the hired party, the extent of
the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work, the
method of payment, the hired party's role in hiring and paying as-
sistants, whether the work is part of the regular business of the hir-
ing party, whether the hiring party is in business, whether employee
benefits are given to the hired party, the tax treatment of the hired
party, and the additional factors set out in § 220 of the Restatement
of Agency.71
To avoid this issue, whenever an employer retains a person to
create a work and that person is not a regular, salaried employee, if
the employer believes that the work will be one made for hire, that
should be stated in the agreement. The agreement should also pro-
vide that the creator of the work assigns to the employer all right
(including all copyright rights), title and interest that he/she may
have under operation of law or otherwise.
2. Joint Authors & Joint Works
Ignoring for the moment 'works made for hire,' under CCNV a
person is an author of a work only when that person contributes
copyrightable subject matter to the work. That is, to be an author,
one must supply more than mere direction or ideas: one must
"translate an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copy-
right protection. ' 72 A joint work is defined as "a work prepared by
two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole."'73 Thus, there are two critical elements of a joint work.
71. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 752 and n.31. The factors set out in § 220 of the RESTATE-
MENT OF AGENCY include: (a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist with-
out supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer
or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools and the place of work for the person
doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of
payment whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the
regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
72. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 737.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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First, there must be at least two authors; that is, at least two persons
contributing copyrightable expression, not just mere ideas.74 Sec-
ond, the contributions must have been made while the authors had
"the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.""5 Joint authors of a joint
work are "co-owners of copyright in the work."76 "Each co-author
automatically becomes a holder of an undivided interest in the
whole."" For example, each co-author has an equal right to exer-
cise all the exclusive rights of a copyright owner set out in 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 such as the right to modify, reproduce, or distribute copies of
the work.78
a. Two Authors
In S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday Inc.,7 9 the Ninth Circuit held that a
person who "told the programmers what tasks the software was to
perform and how it was to sort data,"' "describe[d] the sort of
programs" to be written, but "did none of the coding" and was not
an author and thus the program was not a joint work of that person
and the programmer."1 Under CCNV, to be an author, one must
supply more than mere direction or ideas: one must "translate an
idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protec-
tion."82 In other words, as stated in a subsequent Ninth Circuit
case, "joint authorship requires each author to make an indepen-
dently copyrightable contribution." 3 Thus, according to the S. O.S.
74. The requirement is that the putative author contribute copyrightable expression,
not that he actually was the one to fix that expression in a tangible medium of expression.
More specifically, the Third Circuit recently ruled that an individual qualifies as an author of
a work -or one author of a joint work- when he originates copyrightable expression for the
work, and another person acting under his authority actually fixes the expression in a tangible
medium. Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 135, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1041, 1044 (3rd Cir. 1991). The Third Circuit reasoned that § 101 of the Copy-
right Act defines a work as fixed in a tangible medium of expression when "its embodiment in
a copy ... by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent." Thus, it is
adequate that the expression was fixed "by" the putative author or "under . . . [his]
authority."
75. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a); 886 F.2d 1081, 1086-87.
76. Id.
77. Pye v. Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1978).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3), construed in S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1086,
12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1989) (Stating that, "As a joint author, Payday (through Good-
man) would be entitled to modify, reproduce, or distribute copies of the work.").
79. 886 F.2d 1081, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1989).
80. Id. at 1086-87, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1244-45.
81. Id. at 1087, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1245.
82. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 737.
83. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1541 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Ninth Circuit recognized, however, that at least one commentator (NIMMER, supra note
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court, "[a] person who merely describes to an author what the com-
missioned work should do or look like is not a joint author for pur-
poses of the Copyright Act."" "The supplier of an idea is no more
an author of a program than is the supplier of the disk on which the
program is stored."85
A claim of joint authorship was also rejected in Whelan As-
socs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 86 In Whelan, a dental
laboratory owner commissioned the design of software for use in his
business. The owner argued that he was a joint author because he
"originated the concept of developing an overall computer program
that could accommodate the business needs of a dental laboratory,"
he "disclosed to... [the programmer] in detail the operation and
methods of... [his business]," he "explained to... [the program-
mer] the functions to be performed by the computer," he "helped
design the language and format of some of the screens that would
appear on the computer's visual displays", and he gained "extensive
knowledge and understanding of computers.., and therefore gave
valuable assistance to... [the programmer].""7 The court nonethe-
less found that the programmer was the sole author of the program.
Concentrating principally on the creation of the code,"8 the court
held that the owner's "general assistance and contribution to the
fund of knowledge of the author did not make [him] a creator of
any original work, nor even the co-author."'8 9 The court drew an
analogy to an owner explaining to an architect the type and func-
tions of a building the architect is to design for the owner, where
courts have held that the architectural drawings are not co-au-
thored by the owner, no matter how detailed the ideas and limita-
tions expressed by the owner.90
2, § 6.07 at 6-18) and at least one other circuit (D.C. Circuit) have taken the position that one
might be the author of a joint work by making significant contributions even if they are not
independently copyrightable. Id. Another circuit (Third Circuit) recently acknowledged
that the test for joint authorship remains unresolved, stating that "[a]t this point we need not
decide whether each author of a joint work must make an independently copyrightable con-
tribution." Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 135 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1041, 1044 (3rd Cir. 1991).
84. 886 F.2d at 1087, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1245.
85. Id
86. 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1318-19, 225 U.S.P.Q. 156 (E.D.Pa. 1985), aff'd, Whelan As-
socs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F. 2d 1222, 230 U.S.P.Q. 481 (3d Cir. 1986).
87. Id.
88. If the court had concentrated on the screens, the result may have been different.
89. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1318-19.
90. See eg. Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp.
252, 218 U.S.P.Q. 409 (D. Neb. 1982).
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In Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross,91 the district court found that
Ross' only contribution to an interface for a spreadsheet program
consisted of a handwritten list of suggested commands. Ross ar-
gued that the list was utilized in developing the final list of user
commands for the spreadsheet interface.92 Ross further argued that
the list was expression which he contributed to the interface, ren-
dering the interface a joint work. The court disagreed. The court
noted that code (object and source) is expression. But Ross contrib-
uted no code. The court indicated that implementation of the com-
mands might be expression. But Ross did not participate in the
implementation of the commands. The court explained that the
commands contributed by Ross were "only a list of labels for user
commands, many of which are common commands that were al-
ready available on other software programs" and that "[t]here was
nothing innovative or novel about the labels that Ross proposed...
or the order in which they are listed on the document."93 But that
misses the mark. Novelty is not a requirement, only originality.94
The court concluded that "[a]ll Ross gave to... [the programmer]
was a list of commands he thought should be included in the pro-
gram" and that "Ross merely told... [the programmer] what tasks
he believed the interface should allow the user to perform." How-
ever, according to the court, "[tihe list of commands is only an idea
that is not protected under federal law." Thus, the interface portion
of the spreadsheet program was not a joint work.
Ross appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.95 On appeal, he
reiterated his argument that "the handwritten list of user com-
mands ... was a fixed expression of Ross' ideas," but the Ninth
Circuit held that argument to be "meritless for the reasons given in
the district court's order"; to wit, "[t]he list simply does not qualify
for copyright protection." 96 Ross also argued on appeal that joint
authorship can be based on "an alleged agreement to collaborate
combined with his noncopyrightable contributions to the inter-
face." 97 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that "our circuit
holds that joint authorship requires each author to make an inde-
91. 728 F. Supp. 597, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1734 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd Ashton-Tate Corp. v.
Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1541 (9th Cir. 1990).
92. Id. at 601-02, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1736-37.
93. Id.
94. See eg. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., 113 L.Ed.2d 358, 111
S.Ct. 1282 (1991).
95. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1541 (9th Cir. 1990).
96. Ashton-Tate, 916 F.2d at 521-22.
97. Ashton-Tate, 916 F.2d at 520-21.
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pendently copyrightable contribution."98
b. The Intent Requirement
As noted above, a joint work is defined as "a work prepared by
two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole." 99 The "touchstone... [of a joint work] is the intention, at
the time the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined
into an integrated unit.""' It is therefore crucial that a person as-
serting that a particular work is a joint work demonstrate that at
the time he created his contribution he intended that his contribu-
tion be merged with a contribution of another into a unitary
whole.11 If his work is written "with the intention that [his] contri-
bution.., be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole,"102 then merger of his contribution with that of an-
other creates a joint work. But if such intention occurs only after
his contribution has been completed, then the merger results in
either a derivative work or a compilation,10 3 in which case each
contributing author only owns his contribution and has no rights in
the contributions of the other author. "
98. Ashton-Tate, 916 F.2d at 521. But see supra note 83 discussing the view in other
circuits that one might be the author of a "joint work" by making significant contributions
even if they are not independently copyrightable.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
100. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 120; Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller P.C. v.
Empire Const. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 258-59, 218 U.S.P.Q. 409 (D. Neb. 1982).
101. See, eg., Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller P.C. v. Empire Const. Co., 542 F. Supp.
252, 260, 218 U.S.P.Q. 409 (D. Neb. 1982).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
103. The terms derivative work, compilation and collective work are each defined in
§ 101 of the 1976 Act. A derivative work is defined as "a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation ... or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed or adapted." A compilation is defined as "a work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship" and
"includes collective works." A collective work, which is a type of compilation, is defined as
"a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contri-
butions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a
collective whole."
104. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (b) ("The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends
only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preex-
isting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexist-
ing material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the
scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting
material.").
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V. INFRINGEMENT ISSUES
A. The Fundamentals Of A Copyright Infringement
Determination
To prove that an accused work infringes the copyright in a
copyrighted work, the plaintiff must prove ownership of a valid
copyright, and unlawful (illicit) copying by the defendant of the
copyrighted work.105 Where a plaintiff proves infringement, the de-
fendant may nevertheless avoid liability by establishing the exist-
ence of an affirmative defense. An affirmative defense, such as
copyright misuse, renders the copyright unenforceable at least as
against the particular defendant." 6 Ownership and affirmative de-
fense issues are discussed later on in this writing. Here we concen-
trate on defining the metes and bounds of unlawful copying.
Unlawful copying is generally shown by establishing that the
defendant had access to the copyrighted work before creating its
work, raising the inference that similarities between the two works
are due to copying (as opposed to independent creation); and that
the two works are substantially similar, that is, that the copying
amounted to an appropriation.107 In the rarest of cases, a defendant
can avoid infringement by showing that despite access and substan-
tial similarity, he independently created the work-that is, while he
had access, he did not copy from the copyrighted work because, for
example, he did not actually examine the copyrighted work and/or
the substantial similarity is due to other factors such as use of a
common design known from prior experience. 10 8
105. Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 206, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1322 (9th Cir.
1988); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1989); Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 910, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596
(9th Cir. 1989); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097, 1103 (N.D.
Cal. 1991); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177, 1183 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Whelan
Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F. 2d 1222, 1231 and 1232, 230 U.S.P.Q. 481
(3d Cir. 1986).
106. Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1846 (4th Cir.
1990).
107. Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 206, 207, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1322 (9th
Cir. 1988); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1176, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1989); Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 912-13, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
1596 (9th Cir. 1989); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097, 1103
(N.D. Cal. 1991); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177, 1183 (N.D. Cal. 1989);
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F. 2d 1222, 1231, 230 U.S.P.Q. 481 (3d
Cir. 1986).
108. Keeler Brass Co. v. Continental Brass Co., 862 F.2d 1063, 1065-67, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
1331 (4th Cir. 1988) (the evidence of independent creation which led the district court to find
no infringement, a finding affirmed on appeal, was (1) testimony by the defendant "that he
did not copy the initial drawing; that he did not use it during the design process; that he
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Access means "an opportunity to view or to copy plaintiff's
work," 109 and thus may be established by showing that the defend-
ant had a reasonable opportunity to actually view the plaintiff's
work, or that the defendant actually acquired a copy of the plain-
tiff's work.110 In most software infringement cases, access is either
admitted or easily established so that a finding of infringement turns
entirely on whether the accused program is substantially similar to
the copyrighted program."1 '
Not all copying from a copyrighted work is unlawful. There-
fore, contrary to what many plaintiff's urge, direct evidence of
copying does not eliminate the need to show substantial similarity
between the accused and copyrighted works. 12 A plaintiff cannot
prevail unless he establishes that the two works are substantially
similar.113
A uniform standard for determining substantial similarity in
computer program cases is desperately needed. At present, the
courts decide cases on an ad hoe basis, applying seemingly inconsis-
tent tests."14 Rather than delve into the details of each case and the
test applied therein, it is more productive here to attempt to locate a
common thread among the cAses. A comprehensive study of the
cases reveals that in virtually all jurisdictions, the courts in essence
perform a three-step process. First, the court must identify specific
similarities between the two programs. That is generally an easy
task since the plaintiff typically presents a detailed list of every con-
created his design from his prior experience in the marketplace, which included knowledge of
the primary design element in both drawings-the Chinese key, a common design element
from antiquity"; and (2) "significant dissimilarities between the two drawings"). Technically,
proof of access and substantial similarity combine only to create a presumption of illegal
copying. Id at 1065. The defendant may rebut the presumption with evidence of independ-
ent creation. Id. While some courts have indicated that independent creation is an affirma-
tive defense upon which defendant bears the burden of proof, other courts have held that
independent creation is not an affirmative defense; that a defendant therefore does not have
the burden of proving independent creation, that defendant's burden is merely one of coming
forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption (i.e., create a triable issue); and if
defendant meets that burden, the ultimate burden of proof remains with plaintiff to prove that
the substantial similarity is due to copying. Id. at 1065-67 (recognizing cases indicating the
contrary, but holding that "'independent creation' is not an affirmative defense").
109. Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1062, 216 U.S.P.Q. 376 (9th
Cir. 1981).
110. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
196 U.S.P.Q. 97 (9th Cir. 1977).
Ill. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.03[F].
112. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 910, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596 (9th Cir. 1989).
113. Id.
114. See NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.03[A][1][c] and [d] (describing the various tests
enunciated or applied by various courts in various circuits).
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ceivable similarity as part of its case in chief. Second, it is necessary
to eliminate from the list any similarities in uncopyrightable (un-
protectible) elements of the copyrighted program. This elimination
process, called filtering by one commentator,115 is discussed in sec-
tion 1 below. Third, the remaining similarities-similarities in pro-
tectable expression-must be examined to determine whether they
are substantial to the copyrighted program, thereby rendering the
programs substantially similar. This is discussed in section 2 below.
1. Filtering Out The Unprotected Elements
It is axiomatic that copyright law protects only the expression
of an idea, not the idea, itself.116 That axiom has been substantially
codified in § 102(b) of the 1976 Act which provides that "[i]n no
case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work."' 117 Section 102(b) was specifically included in the 1976 Act
"to make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is
the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the ac-
tual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within
the scope of copyright law." 118 Thus unprotected ideas need to be
filtered out. 119
Furthermore, copyright protection is not "afforded to elements
of expression that necessarily follow from an idea" and are "'as a
practical matter, indispensable or at least standard in the treatment
of a given [idea].' "120 Copyright laws do not protect expression
dictated by the underlying subject matter.121 To do otherwise,
would effectively extend protection to the idea. In these instances,
115. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.03[F] at 13-62.
116. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
117. 17 U.S.C. section 102(b); see NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177, 1179
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (substantial codification).
118. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 57 (comments on 17 U.S.C. § 102). See Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1250 (3d Cir. 1983). The
HOUSE REPORT further states that the term literary works ".. . also includes computer data
bases, and computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the program-
mer's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves." HousE RE-
PORT, supra note 10, at 54 (comments on 17 U.S.C. § 102).
119. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.03[F][1].
120. Data East USA, Inc. v. EPYX, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1322 (9th Cir.
1988) (quoting Alioti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987)). -
121. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1250 (3d
Cir. 1983); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d. 141, 143, 219 U.S.P.Q. 711 (9th Cir. 1983).
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the idea and expression are said to have merged.122 Thus, "ele-
ments of expression that necessarily flow from an idea" must be
filtered out as well.
The problem here is that courts generally define the idea of a
computer program so broadly that virtually nothing is excluded at
this stage. For example, in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, Inc.,12 the court noted that the purpose or function of
a computer program is, of course, an uncopyrightable idea and
"anything necessary to effecting that function is also, necessarily,
part of the idea, too." 124. But the court went on to define the idea of
the copyrighted program as "to aid the business operations of a den-
tal laboratory"1 25 and "efficient organization of a dental labora-
tory." '126 Everything else was protected expression, not the idea.127
Similarly, in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp.,128 the Third Circuit held that "[i]f other programs can be
written or created which perform the same function as an Apple's
operating system program, then that program is an expression of an
idea . . .," and broadly defined the function (or idea) of Apple's
122. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742, 170 U.S.P.Q.
557 (9th Cir. 1971) ("When the 'idea' and its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the
'expression' will not be barred, since protecting the 'expression' would confer a monopoly of
the 'idea' upon the copyright owner free of the conditions and limitations imposed by the
patent law."); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Where an idea and the expression 'merge,' or are 'insepa-
rable,' the expression is not given copyright protection.").
123. 797 F.2d 1222, 230 U.S.P.Q. 481 (3d Cir. 1986).
124. Id at 1236.
125. Id at 1238.
126. Id at 1240.
127. The Whelan court concluded:
the structure of the program was not essential to that task: there are other
programs on the market, competitors of Dentalab and Dentcom, that perform
the same function but have different structures and design.
Id at 1238.
The court did, however, state:
We do not mean to imply that the idea or purpose behind every utilitarian or
functional work will be precisely what it accomplishes, and that the structure
and organization will therefore always be part of the expression of such works.
The idea or purpose behind a utilitarian work may be to accomplish a certain
function in a certain way, see eg., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 100 (referring to
Selden's book as explaining "a peculiar system of book-keeping"), and the
structure or function of a program might be essential to that task. There is no
suggestion in the record, however, that the purpose of the Dentalab program
was anything so refined; it was simply to run a dental laboratory in an efficient
way.
Id at 1238 n.34.
128. 714 F.2d 1240, 1253, 219 U.S.P.Q. 113 (3rd Cir. 1983).
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operating system program as "to translate source code into object
code." Everything else was protected expression, not the idea.
Likewise, in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 129
the idea was broadly defined as "a computer program for an elec-
tronic spreadsheet."
2. Substantial Similarity
Once unprotectible similarities have been filtered out, a deter-
mination must be made whether or not the remaining similarities
are substantial to the copyrighted program. This is a qualitative,
not quantitative, analysis. 130 It is here that the courts apply widely
diverse standards.
In copyright disputes involving traditional works such as the
fanciful costumed characters in a juvenile television show, the au-
diovisual displays of an electronic game, or even the user interface
(screen displays) for a graphics program, the Ninth Circuit has ap-
plied a subjective, intrinsic test in which infringement is found
where the ordinary, reasonable, lay observer finds the 'total concept
and feel' of the two works to be substantially similar.13 The Ninth
Circuit has also applied this standard in computer program cases. 32
The Third Circuit concluded "that the ordinary observer test is
not useful and is potentially misleading when the subjects of the
copyright are particularly complex, such as computer programs." 133
The court explained they "do not apply the ordinary observer test
in copyright cases involving exceptionally difficult materials, like
computer programs."1 34 In its place, some courts have relied exclu-
sively on expert testimony, looking at similarities and differences
129. 740 F. Supp. 37, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577, 1597 (D. Mass. 1990).
130. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1245-46, 230
U.S.P.Q. 481 (3rd Cir. 1986).
131. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164, 196 U.S.P.Q. 97 (9th Cir. 1977) (fanciful costumed characters in a juvenile television
show); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1322 (9th Cir.
1988) (audiovisual displays of an electronic game); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc.,
547 F. Supp. 222, 215 U.S.P.Q. 929 (D. Md. 1981) (same); Broderbund Software, Inc. v.
Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1136-37, 231 U.S.P.Q. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (user
interface or screen displays for a graphics program); Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v.
Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 465, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (main
menu or status screen for communications software); Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913,
10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596 (9th Cir. 1989).
132. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175-76, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1989).
133. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231, 230
U.S.P.Q. 481 (3d Cir. 1986).
134. Id.
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between the programs, but still requiring a conclusion that the ac-
cused product capture the 'total concept and feel' of the copy-
righted program for the two programs to be substantially similar. 135
Another court relied exclusively on expert testimony and totally
abandoned the 'total concept and feel' standard, looking solely at
the "'quantitative and qualitative evidence of the similarities' as
gauged by the Court's evaluation of expert testimony."' 136 The
court applied "a single substantial similarity inquiry according to
which both lay and expert testimony would be admissible."' 137 But
whatever standard is applied, the inquiry boils down to "a value
judgment, involving an assessment of the importance of the material
copied." 13 1
a. The Fewer The Ways Of Expressing An Idea,
The Closer The Similarity Must Be To Be
Deemed Substantial
There are times where there are only a limited number of ways
of expressing an idea. An example may be a short microinstruction
routine subject to significant hardware constraints. In such case,
the idea and expression have not merged since the idea (function) of
the routine can be expressed in a number of different ways (different
microroutines). Nevertheless, because of the limited number of
ways of expressing the idea, the courts find no substantial similarity
absent "virtually identical copying."' 39 Thus, it can be seen that
the fewer the methods of expressing an idea, the more the allegedly
infringing work must resemble the copyrighted work in order to
135. Pearl Sys., Inc. v. Competition Elecs., Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1520-24 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(conclusion #3).
136. E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1493, 228
U.S.P.Q. 891 (D. Minn. 1985) ("the fact finder's focus shifts from the hypothetical ordinary
observer's impression of the 'total concept and feel' of the copyrighted and allegedly infring-
ing works to an analysis of the 'quantitative and qualitative evidence of the similarities' as
gauged by the Court's evaluation of expert testimony. The fiction of the lay observer is thus
abandoned in favor of an analysis of similarities and differences in the copyrighted and alleg-
edly offending computer programs.").
137. Id.
138. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.03[F][5] at 13-74.
139. Frybarger v. Int'l Business Machs. Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1135
(9th Cir. 1987) (video game; no infringement); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
1177, 1188-89 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (microcode for controlling microprocessor; no infringement);
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d. 485, 488, 221 U.S.P.Q. 1140
(9th Cir. 1984) (Scrabble strategy book; no infringement); Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v.
Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 491-92, 228 U.S.P.Q. 275 (9th Cir. 1985) (Radiator
catalog; no infringement).
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establish substantial similarity."4
B. Copying The Literal Code Of A Program -Source,
Object, Machine
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,"' Apple
sold its popular Apple II personal computer with operating system
programs embedded in computer memory chips called ROMs
(Read Only Memory). Franklin copied the object code into its
"Apple-compatible" computer called the ACE 100. Franklin ar-
gued that while a computer program's source code, written in a
high level computer language and meant to be read by humans, is
copyrightable, the object code, which is a series of binary digits for
execution by a machine, is not copyrightable and could therefore be
freely copied. 42 The Court rejected that argument, finding that the
object code, which falls squarely within the definition of a computer
program in the 1976 Act, is a copyrightable literary work under the
Act. 43 Franklin also argued that while a program on a computer
printout may be copyrightable, a program embedded in a com-
puter's memory such as a ROM is not copyrightable and can be
freely copied because the memory is a utilitarian object or machine
part. The Court rejected that argument finding that a program
stored in a ROM is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression"
and that is all the 1976 Act requires.'" Finally, Franklin argued
that while applications programs which perform a particular task
for the computer user such as word processing may be copyright-
140. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d. 485, 488, 221
U.S.P.Q. 1140 (9th Cir. 1984).
141. 714 F.2d 1240, 219 U.S.P.Q. 113 (3rd Cir. 1983).
142. In WilliamsElecs., Inc. v. ArticInt'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876 n.7, 215 U.S.P.Q. 405
(3rd Cir. 1982), the Court quoted the definitions of source code and object code in the
CONTU Final Report:
A source code is a computer program written in any of several programming
languages employed by computer programmers. An object code is the version
of a program in which the source code language is converted or translated into
the machine language of the computer with which it is to be used.
143. The 1976 Act, as amended in 1980, defines a computer program as "a set of state-
ments or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101. The 1976 Act defines literary works as "works, other than
audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or
indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manu-
scripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101.
144. The 1976 Act provides that "Copyright protection subsists.. .in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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able, operating systems programs which generally manage the inter-
nal operations of the computer are an uncopyrightable "process,
system, [or] method of operation"14 or "purely utilitarian
work." '146 The Court rejected these arguments as well, finding that
an operating system program copyright protects the instructions
which control the computer's operation, not the process, system or
method of operation of the computer; and that the use of a copy-
rightable work in a useful article, such as a computer, does not ne-
gate copyrightability as illustrated by the definition of a computer
program in the Act which covers "a set of... instructions... used
directly... in a computer.., to bring about a certain result." 47
In other cases the defendant has made similar arguments but
from a slightly different perspective. In Apple, Franklin argued that
what it copied was not copyrightable such that, Franklin could
copy Apple's object code program from a ROM because the pro-
gram in that form was not protectable under the copyright laws.
But in an earlier case, Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Interna-
tional, Inc.,14 the defendant also argued that use of a copyrighted
program in a utilitarian way to control a machine was not a copy of
the copyrighted program within the meaning of the 1976 Act and
thus not an act of infringement. 149 That argument was rejected
based on the definition of copy in the 1976 Act, namely, "material
objects.., in which a work is fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device."' 15 0
In NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp.,"'1 the Court held that Intel's
microcodes for its 8086 and 8088 microprocessors were copyright-
145. The 1976 Act provides that "In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (emphasis added). The Legislative
History to the 1976 Act explains that "Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to
make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a
computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are
not within the scope of copyright law." HousE REPORT, at 57 (comments on 17 U.S.C.
§ 102).
146. The argument that purely utilitarian works are not copyrightable stems from an
early Supreme Court case. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 25 L.Ed. 841 (1880).
147. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
148. 685 F.2d 870, 215 U.S.P.Q. 405 (3rd Cir. 1982).
149. The 1976 Act gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to make and distribute
copies of a copyrighted work in the U.S. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)&(3).
150. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
151. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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able.1" 2 NEC had argued that the microprocessor was a computer
comprised of circuitry and the microcode. Thus, the microcode was
a defining element or defining part of the computer, rather than in-
structions used in the computer. Therefore, the microcode was not
a computer program within the meaning of the Act which defined
that term as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain re-
sult." '153 Hence, microcode was not copyrightable. The Court dis-
agreed. It defined the microprocessor (computer) as the circuitry.
It then defined the microcode as that which "consists of a series of
instructions that tell a microprocessor which of its thousands of
transistors to actuate in order to perform the tasks directed by the
macroinstruction set" and "[a]s such; it comes squarely within the
definition of a computer program." ' Once that had been decided,
the Court merely noted that there is nothing in the Act which sug-
gests a different result concerning copyrightability for different
types of computer programs based upon the function they serve
within the machine."' 5 The Court could have avoided NEC's quasi-
semantical argument centering around whether the microcode was
part of the computer (and thus not a computer program) or was
instructions to the computer (and thus was a computer program),
by simply noting that the microcode was copyrightable as a literary
work whether or not it fell squarely within the definition of a com-
puter program.-
6
In summary, the Apple, Williams and NEC trilogy of cases
firmly establish that the literal code (literal manifestations) of a
computer program is copyrightable in any form (e.g., high level
source code, object code), used for any purpose (e.g., applications
programs, operating systems programs, and microcode), and fixed
in any medium (e.g., paper or ROMs).15 7
152. The Court defined microcode as follows: "A microcode consists of a series of in-
structions that tell a microprocessor which of its thousands of transistors to actuate in order
to perform the tasks directed by the macroinstruction set." Ido at 1178.
153. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
154. Id. at 1178.
155. Ido at 1179.
156. Recall that the 1976 Act defines literary works as including "works... expressed in
... numbers.. . regardless of the nature of the material objects.., in which they are
embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Another case to hold that microcode is copyrightable is Allen-
Myland, Inc. v. Int'l Business Macls. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 531, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1817 (E.D.
Pa. 1990) (microcode for IBM 3090 mainframe computers is copyrightable subject matter).
157. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Source and object code, the literal components of a pro-
gram, are consistently held protected by a copyright on the program.); Whelan Assocs., Inc.
v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234, 230 U.S.P.Q. 481 (3rd Cir. 1986) (court
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Early copyists copied all the literal code from a copyrighted
program. Literal copying of virtually all of the copyrighted code
will result in a substantially similar program."l 8 The direct de-
scendants of these pioneering copyists copied only a qualitatively
important portion of the copyrighted code, such as some of the
most important subroutines. Since substantial similarity is a quali-
tative, not quantitative, analysis,159 such copying has resulted in a
substantially similar, infringing program." °
C. Infringement By Porting Or Translating
The Literal Code
The fact that a copyrighted program written in one computer
language to run on one type of computer is rewritten in another
computer language to run on a different computer will not save the
translated program from being an infringement. For example, in
SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc.,16 1 the court
held that plaintiff's copyright in its statistical analysis program for
use on IBM-compatible computers was infringed by defendant's
program for use on DEC VAX computers. Likewise, in Whelan
Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,62 the court held
that plaintiff's copyright in a program written in EDL for an IBM
Series One Computer was infringed by defendant's program written
in Basic for an IBM PC. Similarly, in E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden
Corp. of America,1 61 the Court held that plaintiff's copyright in a
program written in Intel 8049 microprocessor assembly language
was held to be infringed by a translation of the program to Hitachi
evaluating "whether a program's copyright protection covers the structure of the program or
only the program's literal elements, Le., its source and object codes"); Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577, 1580 (D.C. Mass. 1990)
("The parties agree, as a general proposition, that literal manifestations of a computer pro-
gram -including both source code and object code- if original, are copyrightable.").
158. See, eg., Apple Computer. Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252,
219 U.S.P.Q. 113 (3rd Cir. 1983); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875,
215 U.S.P.Q. 405 (3rd Cir. 1982).
159. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1245-46, 230
U.S.P.Q. 481 (3rd Cir. 1986).
160. See In re Certain Personal Computers, 224 U.S.P.Q. 270 (U.S. Int. Tr. Com. 1984)
(of the 70 subroutines in the copyrighted program, defendant copied, identically or nearly
identically, 23 of the 32 most important subroutines constituting about 18-25% of the copy-
righted program); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485, 228
U.S.P.Q. 891 (D. Minn. 1985) (In finding plaintiff's computer program copyright infringed,
the court found (among other things) that 38 of 44 subroutines found in plaintiff's program
were duplicated in defendant's competing program).
161. 605 F. Supp. 816, 225 U.S.P.Q. 916 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
162. 797 F.2d 1222, 230 U.S.P.Q. 481 (3d Cir. 1986).
163. 623 F. Supp. 1485, 228 U.S.P.Q. 891 (D. Minn. 1985).
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HD63BO5X2P microprocessor/assembly language.' The copier's
program is in essence an infringing derivative work of the copy-
righted program, since the former is a translation or adaption or
transformation of the latter.16
D. Infringement By Copying The Sequence, Structure And
Organization Of The Literal Code
In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,16
a case of first impression, the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court
finding (after a full trial on the merits) that defendant's dental lab
program for dental laboratory record keeping infringed plaintiff's
copyright in its dental lab program because the structure, sequence
and organization of the two programs (called the "non-literal" ele-
ments of the programs) were substantially similar. The structure,
sequence and organization of a program is copyrightable subject
matter under the copyright laws. Copyright protection is not lim-
ited to the source and object codes referred to as the literal elements
of the program. While a case of first impression, the Whelan deci-
sion found support in both the CONTU Final Report and at least
one reported decision. The CONTU Final Report stated that flow
charts for a program, if sufficiently detailed, would be copyright-
able. 66 A flow chart essentially represents the sequence, organiza-
tion and structure of a computer program. Subsequent courts,
relying on the CONTU Report, have indicated that flow charts are
copyrightable.1 67 Also, one year before "helan, a district court in
Tennessee used similarity in structure and organization as one fac-
tor in determining substantial similarity. 161 Whelan has been fol-
164. The term "derivative work" is defined in the 1976 Act as "a work based upon one
or more preexisting works, such as a translation... or any other form in which a work may
be recast, transformed or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
165. 609 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd 797 F.2d 1222, 230 U.S.P.Q. 481 (3rd Cir.
1986), cerL denied 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
166. The CONTU Report stated "Flowcharts . .. are works of authorship in which
copyright subsists, provided they are the product of sufficient intellectual labor to surpass the
'insufficient intellectual labor hurdle' ... ".
167. In Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 45, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
1577 (D. Mass. 1990) the court, citing and quoting from the CONTU Final Report, stated
"[alIso, it appears that flowcharts, if sufficiently detailed and original, are entitled to copy-
right protection.. ." Id. at 45.'
168. In SAS Inst. v. S & H Computer Sys, 605 F. Supp. 816, 225 U.S.P.Q. 916 (M.D.
Tenn. 1985), following trial, the Tennessee district court held that plaintiff's copyright in its
statistical analysis program for use on IBM-compatible computers was infringed by defend-
ant's program for use on DEC VAX computers, and enjoined all future marketing of the
infringing program. Defendant licensed plaintiff's program only to obtain the source code to
do an IBM-to-DEC conversion, and committed numerous evil acts including the destruction
of evidence. The court found substantial similarity in the evidence of: 44 instances of direct
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lowed by courts of appeal in other circuits. For example, in
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Systems, Inc.,69 the
Ninth Circuit found that the district court did not err in prelimina-
rily enjoining defendant from marketing its program based on a pre-
liminary finding that the program copied the structure, sequence
and organization of plaintiff's copyrighted program and, therefore,
was substantially similar to plaintiff's program.17 0
E. An Aberrational Case Providing Hope For The Accused
Infringer
In Q-CO Industries, Inc. v. Hoffman,171 plaintiff had a copy-
righted teleprompter program, called VPS-500, for use with Atari
computers. Two former employees left, hired a third party to create
a comparable program, called CPC-1000, for the IBM PC, and one
of the employees provided the third party with the vision of the
program and other instructions as to how the program should be
developed.172 The court found that the accused CPC-1000 program
had a total of four modules "similar in structure and organization,
including a few textual similarities" to four corresponding modules
in the copyrighted VPS-500 program;' 73 that the organization or
ordering of functions and how those functions are performed were
similar;' 74 and that "[fMrom the similarity of the modules, their
structure and function and the obvious availability to Som [defend-
ant] of the VPS-500 program, it is rational to infer that it was used
by Som... in developing the CPC-1000 program."' 75 These find-
ings would seem to have compelled a finding of infringement under
Whelan and its progeny.' 76 The idea would be a teleprompter pro-
copying; much more instances of direct copying before defendant destroyed evidence relating
to an earlier version; and admitted copying of the structure and organization or organiza-
tional scheme or organization and structural details of the program. Id. at 826.30.
169. 886 F.2d 1173, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 1989).
170. Id at 1175-76. The Ninth Circuit stated that "[w]hether the non-literal compo-
nents of a program, including the structure, sequence and organization and user interface, are
protected depends on whether, on the particular facts of each case, the component in question
qualifies as an expression of an idea, or an idea itself." Id. at 1175. While the Fifth Circuit in
Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635 (5th
Cir. 1987) "decline[d] to embrace Whelan", in fact the decision is consistent with Whelan.
The Plains Cotton court merely found (rightly or wrongly) that to the extent there were
similarities in the sequence, organization and structure of the two programs, the idea and
expression had merged. Id. at 1262.
171. 625 F. Supp. 608, 228 U.S.P.Q. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
172. Id. at 613, 618.
173. Id. at 614.
174. Id at 614-15.
175. Id at 615.
176. The court further noted that "[t]here is also a similarity in the terminology used in
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gram, and the expression would be the particular sequence, organi-
zation and structure. Nevertheless, the court denied a preliminary
injunction to the plaintiff, concluding, without elaboration, that
"[h]ere it was the idea which was used rather than its
expression."' 177
In making its final determination, the court was seemingly in-
fluenced by the substantive differences made necessary by the differ-
ent computers. The court, for example, noted that the two
programs were "written in different computer languages"; 178 that
"direct copying was impossible since the Atari programming was in
Basic and IBM in Pascal"; 179 that "a different program, different
because of language and hardware, had to be devised"; 8 ' and that
"[slavish] copying is impossible here, given the differences between
the hardware for the Atari and IBM computers." '8 In other
words, this court found that where differences between the pro-
grams arise primarily from differences in the hardware, infringe-
ment can be avoided.1 82 Yet that conclusion would seem hopelessly
irreconcilable with the SAS-Whelan-Uniden cases discussed above,
in which porting or translating was insufficient to avoid
infringement.
F. Possible Infringement By Copying File Structures
In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. ,13
the Third Circuit held that the file structures of a dental lab record
keeping program had an arrangement and organization which con-
veyed information and are thus copyrightable:
The file structures in the Dentalab and Dentcom systems require
certain information and order that information in a particular
fashion. Other programs might require different information or
might use the same information differently.... [W]e have no
doubt that these file structures are sufficiently informative to de-
serve copyright protection. 184
the respective menu lists in the second module of each of the two programs." Q-CO Indus. v.
Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 614, 228 U.S.P.Q. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
177. Id. at 616.
178. Id. at 614.
179. Id. at 615.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 616.
182. The court had earlier noted that "[t]he differences between the programs arise pri-
marily from the hardware deficiencies in the IBM-PC relevant to the screen display." Id. at
613.
183. 797 F.2d 1222, 230 U.S.P.Q. 481 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert denied 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
184. Id. at 1243.
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The Third Circuit went on to hold that the defendant's program
infringed the copyrighted program in part based on the similarities
in the ifie structures of the two programs. But it is not clear from
the decision whether copying of fie structures, without more, would
or could render a program infringing (that is, substantially similar
to a copyrighted program). In Whelan, infringement was found
based on much more than copying of fie structures. Specifically,
the Third Circuit affirmed the finding of substantial similarity based
on the similarity of the file structures, the screen outputs, and the
structure and sequence of five of the most important subroutines.18 5
Moreover, the Third Circuit did indicate that in at least certain cir-
cumstances similarity in fie structures will not result in a finding of
infringement:
It is true that for certain tasks there are only a very limited
number of file structures available, and in such cases the struc-
tures might not be copyrightable and similarity of fie structures
might not be strongly probative of similarity of the program as a
whole. We are simply not convinced that this is such a case.18 6
1. Avoiding "File Structure" Infringement Through
The Use Of Preprocessors
A way to avoid infringement based on similarity in file struc-
tures while still maintaining complete compatibility may be to use a
preprocessor which converts data created for the program being
emulated into the user's own internal data format. For example, in
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 187 the court com-
mented that defendant did not have to use the same macro com-
mand language as used in the copyrighted spreadsheet program of
the industry leader it was emulating since it could have provided a
macro conversion utility to translate macros written for the copy-
righted program.18 1 Similarly, in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. Uni-
versity Computing Co.,"89 the court held that a defendant's
computer software, including a preprocessor program for accepting
data in a certain input format, in which the plaintiff claimed copy-
right was non-infringing. In Digital Communications Associates,
Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp.,19 the court commented that a
185. Id. at 1248.
186. Id. at 1243 n.43.
187. 740 F. Supp. 37, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577 (D. Mass. 1990).
188. Id. at 69.
189. 462 F. Supp. 1003, 199 U.S.P.Q. 537 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
190. 659 F. Supp. 449, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
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"comparable situation [to Synercom] would have occurred had the
defendants designed a program which accepted all of the same com-
mands utilized by the plaintiff..."191
G. Infringement By Programming A "Method" Described In
A Manual
In Williams v. Arndt,192 plaintiff devised a specific, step-by-step
method for trading in various commodities through making predic-
tions in the commodities market by analyzing historical data such
as prices and trends over a period of time. Plaintiff wrote a manual
setting forth his method. Plaintiff copyrighted the manual. De-
fendant programmed the step-by-step method writing code for each
step in the method (e.g., input certain historical data, perform cer-
tain calculations or comparisons in a certain order to arrive at a
value (signal) indicating where the commodity is likely to go and
therefore what the broker should do, and the like). Plaintiff alleged
that the program infringed his copyright in the manual.
The court found that the defendant's computer program was
not "a new and different expression of the idea of a market trading
system," but rather the implementation or translation of that sys-
tem from English (the manual) to source code. The court also
found that defendant's program infringed plaintiff's manual copy-
right because "[h]ere, Arndt merely translated Williams work from
English into computer language (in this case, Basic) which pro-
duced substantially similar results"; the "source code contained
similarities which generated identical signals in the vast majority of
comparisons"; and using one example, going through the step-by-
step process of both systems the results of the two systems were
"essentially the same." '193 The court had earlier commented that
"[t]he output of Williams' manuals and Amdt's programs was sub-
stantially the same, even though one was written in English and one
was written in a computer language or source code" and "[i]n over-
all structure, the two competing systems are substantially simi-
lar." 94 The plaintiff's expert had testified that of the seven unique
features set out in the manual, defendant's program had at least six
and "generated signals that were 75% the same," '195 and that, "[i]n
his opinion, the source code meant nothing since the program can
191. Id. at 460.
192. 626 F. Supp. 571, 227 U.S.P.Q. 615 (D. Mass. 1985).
193. Id. at 579.
194. Id. at 576.
195. Id at 580.
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be written in various ways. But when the output is the same, the
program is the same."1 96
Thus, in this case the court is extending copyright protection
for the step-by-step method set forth in the manual and the output
from that method. It is not for the expression of the method. The
case is wrongly decided. Nevertheless, if applied by other courts, it
bodes poorly for the person who develops a compatible computer
program using the methods set out in a manual. 197
H. Infringement By Copying The User Interface
Early on, computer generated screens for video games were
found copyrightable as audiovisual works. 198 That protection was
soon extended to the user interface (menus) of computer programs.
It is now well-settled that all aspects of a computer program not
dictated by its overall function may constitute protectable'expres-
sion.1 99 The purpose or function of the program is its uncopyright-
able idea, and everything else that is not necessary to that purpose
or function would be part of the copyrightable expression of that
idea.2"° Thus, the structure, sequence and organization of a pro-
gram and its user interface qualify for copyright protection where
there are alternative ways to design these aspects of the program.20'
The overall structure, sequence and arrangement of the screens,
text, and artwork (i.e., the audiovisual displays in general) are pro-
tected under the copyright laws.
20 2
196. Id. at 581.
197. See Evans Newton v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 893 n.4, 895 n.6, 230
U.S.P.Q. 166 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 949 (1986) (infringement of manual for
management program; similarities in computer program relevant evidence of similarities in
manual).
198. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrew, 783 F.2d 421, 228 U.S.P.Q. 705 (4th Cir. 1986);
Williams Elec. v. Artic Int'l, 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l,
547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd 704 F.2d 1009, 218 U.S.P.Q. 791 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert denied 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
199. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 230 U.S.P.Q. 481 (3d Cir.
1986), cerL denied 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
200. Id. at 1236.
201. Johnson Controls v. Phoenix Control Sys., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175-76, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
1566 (9th Cir. 1989); Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1991,
1993-94 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ('Copyright protection applies to the user interface, or overall
structure and organization of a computer program, including its audiovisual displays, or
screen 'look and feel.' ").
202. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1135, 231 U.S.P.Q. 700
(N.D.Cal. 1986); Mfg. Tech. v. Cams, 706 F. Supp. 984, 994, 10 U.S.P.Q. 1321 (D.C. Conn.
1989) (holding that copyright protection extends to the user interface, including the sequence
or flow of screens and the content of specific screens); Digital Communications Assoc. v.
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For example, in Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Fox Software,2"3 Ashton-
Tate sued Fox with infringement of its copyright in the user inter-
face of its popular dBASE III PLUS computer program. Accord-
ing to papers filed by Ashton-Tate, the copyrightable aspects of the
user interface included (1) the specific sequence or flow of the
screens (menus, visual displays) presented to the user; (2) each indi-
vidual screen; and (3) the command set or command structure in-
cluding about 400 different commands (declarative statements or
instructions through which the user communicates with the com-
puter system) such as CREATE, BROWSE, DISPLAY STRUC-
TURE, DISPLAY STATUS, APPEND, and the like.
In Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distrib-
uting Corp.,2' the court held that plaintiff's copyright in the main
menu (status screen) of its Crosstalk communication software was
infringed by defendant's Mirror communication software which in-
cluded a substantially similar main menu (status screen).205
Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 459, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (finding
infringement where defendant copied a single status screen of plaintiff's computer program).
203. 760 F. Supp. 831 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (order invalidating copyrights); 760 F. Supp.
831, 832, 24 Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) %26,714 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (order rescinding first order;
only the CCH reporter includes a declaration of the Register of Copyrights which may have
influenced the judge's decision to rescind his first order). Each order is only a few lines. The
facts are taken from pleadings filed in the case.
204. 659 F. Supp. 449, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
205. Plaintiff's program, called Crosstalk, for communication between microcomputers,
and defendant's program, called Mirror. Id. at 452-53. Plaintiff had copyright registration on
the program itself which was not at issue. Plaintiff also had registration on its main menu or
status screen which it alleged was infringed by the corresponding screen in defendant's Mir-
ror.
Georgia district court held that although a copyright in a game's audiovisual display will
protect all copies (i.e., things that can be used to reproduce the displays including the under-
lying computer program), a copyright in the program will not protect the audiovisual display
which it creates since the display cannot reproduce (and therefore is not a copy of) the pro-
gram. Thus, the computer program copyright is not infringed by copying the status screen.
The court held the status screen to be copyrightable subject matter over the alleged
application of the idea/expression dichotomy. The idea was the manner in which the status
screen operates, typing two symbols at the bottom corresponding to a particular command
followed by a value which causes the computer to change the status of the system accordingly
and reflect the change at the top of the screen. The expression is the actual text and the
organization and layout of the screen. Id. at 458.
The court found Synercom inapplicable. Synercom would be on point if defendant devel-
oped a program to accept the data inputted on the screen as was the case with the Synercom
preprocessor program which accepted data from the input card. Instead, the present case is
like the hypothetical posed in Synercom in which the defendant would have copied the input
format cards which would have been an infringement. The status screen in this case is analo-
gous to the input forms in Synercom. Id. at 460.
The court rejected application of the blank form doctrine since the screen conveyed
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In Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp.,2°6 the court
stated that "[c]opyright protection applies to the user interface, or
overall structure and organization of a computer program, includ-
ing its audiovisual displays, or screen 'look and feel,'" but found
that the nine menus in defendant's computer outlining program
were not substantially similar to the nine corresponding menus in
the plaintiff's copyrighted program.20 7
In Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Intl.,208 the district
court held that the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface or "the menu struc-
ture, taken as a whole-including the choice of command terms, the
structure and order of those terms, their presentation on the screen,
and the long prompts," was copyrightable and infringed by defend-
ant's compatible spreadsheet program.20 9
In Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.,210 the Cal-
ifornia district court held, after a full liability trial, that plaintiff's
audiovisual copyright in the menus (screens) of its mass marketed
computer program called "The Print Shop" for creating and print-
ing customized banners, signs, posters, calendars, stationery, greet-
ing cards, and the like, was infringed by defendant's competing
program called "PrintMaster." The court held that the menu
screens (user interface) were copyrightable subject matter, properly
registered as an audiovisual work, and that such copyright pro-
tected against copying of the overall layout, sequence, structure, se-
quencing and arrangement of the screens, which is also
copyrightable subject matter. Thus, copyright protection extended
to each individual screen including not only the words of the screen
but also the structure or arrangement of words on the screen. Addi-
tionally, copyright protection extended to the order, sequence and
arrangement of the screens relative to each other such as which
screen followed which during execution. The court found that the
total concept and feel of these programs "is virtually identical" as
information. Ia at 462. The court found the status screen to be a compilation of informa-
tion/terms rather than a derivative work. Id at 463.
Finally, placing the two status screen side-by-side (Exhs. A and B) demonstrated that
they were substantially similar. In so finding, the court applied the Ninth Circuit 2-step
intrinsic/extrinsic test for substantial similarity. As to the extrinsic test, the two screens
performed the very same function and thus were substantially similar under the extrinsic test.
As to the intrinsic test, the court found that the total concept and feel of the screens when
placed side-by-side was evident. Id. at 465.
206. 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1991 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
207. Id. at 1993-94.
208. 740 F. Supp. 37, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577 (D. Mass 1990).
209. Id. at 67-68.
210. 648 F. Supp. 1127, 231 U.S.P.Q. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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"the ordinary observer could hardly avoid being struck by the eerie
resemblance between the screens of the two programs." '211
I. Infringement By Copying The "Physical" or "Hardwarel"
User Interface
In Pearl Systems, Inc. v. Competition Electronics, Inc.,212 plain-
tiff made and sold a shot timer device used in competitive pistol
shooting. The timer was controlled by a microprocessor and a
copyrighted control program. The timer had a shot review function
which permitted the user to determine the total number of shots
fired and the time between consecutive shots during a given round
and a par time function used to measure the number of shots fired
in a pre-set time period. A different subroutine controlled each
function. In order to utilize a function, the user pressed and re-
leased certain buttons in a predetermined order. The corresponding
subroutine would then process the data from the buttons to perform
the subject function and display the results. The defendant sold a
competing shot timer which, like plaintiff's product, was controlled
by a microprocessor and a control program. Further, for all practi-
cal purposes, the buttons were the same as in plaintiff's timer and
would be pressed and released in the same order to perform the
subject functions. The court held that the defendant's computer
program infringed the plaintiff's copyright in its program because
the two were substantially similar (virtually identical) at the sys-
tems level design."1 3 From the decision, it appears that the only
similarity was that in each program when a certain button was
pressed or released the program would obtain the same result. In
other words, defining the operation and function of each button in
the same way as in plaintiff's timer resulted in the programs being
substantially similar and having the same 'total concept and feel.'214
The similarities of the programs at the system level appeared dic-
tated by the similarities in the button definition.
From this, one can see that the buttons and their definition
were treated as the equivalent of the user interface in the more typi-
cal software case. Indeed, if the programs ran on a personal com-
puter, the buttons could be replaced with button icons. What is
troublesome is that in the PC situation, the courts find infringement
based on similarities in the user interface such that the user inter-
211. Id. at 1137.
212. 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1520 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
213. Id at 1522-23.
214. Id. at 1524.
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face is protected by copyright so that similarities at that level in-
fringe. But here, the physical buttons on the timer were utilitarian
and not protected by copyright. Therefore, the court's finding of
copyright infringement appears to have been based on similarities in
the programs dictated by non-copyrightable subject matter. Once
the use and function of the keys are defined, any program that
would implement that definition would infringe. That conclusion is
evident from the fact that to demonstrate alternative, non-infringing
software, one of plaintiff's experts designed and wrote software for
a shot timer device "[w]ithout being.., shown any shot timer de-
vice"; he was told only the functions that had to be performed. 215
Of course if a program is not defined by the buttons it can be much
more different.
J. Contributory Infringement By Allowing Modification Of A
Copyrighted Program
In Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic International, Inc.,216 the plaintiff
had an audiovisual copyright on its video game. Defendant sold a
printed circuit board which sped up the video game. The court held
that when the consumer used the defendant's board he generated an
audiovisual work which was a derivative work of the plaintiff's au-
diovisual work and thus infringed plaintiff's copyright. Defendant
was subject to liability for contributing to that infringement.217
The legal principles pronounced in Midway might arguably be
applied to computer software areas where a third party develops
add-on software to a popular program such as the Lotus 1-2-3
spreadsheet program or Wordperfect wordprocessing program.
The add on program would operate as an extension of the original
program, thereby creating a derivative work, or so the argument
would go. The argument would gain strength, and possibly be per-
suasive, if the add on program actually modified any of the code of
the original program.
Indeed, in a recent case, Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc.,21 the defendant Galoob argued that a Midway-
type holding would have a dramatic negative impact on the com-
puter industry, stating:
215. Id. at 1522.
216. 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd 704 F.2d 1009, 218 U.S.P.Q. 791 (7th Cir.
1983), cerL denied 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
217. Id. at 1013-14.
218. 923 F.2d 862, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 6572, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1160 (full text
slip opinion) (9th Cir. 1991).
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Many purchasers of computer software programs find that their
use of that software is enhanced by modifications of it for their
own personal use.... [Mlost buyers do so by purchasing "add-
on" software that modifies or adds to the underlying software
program to make the program work more effectively or conve-
niently for the purchaser. There are hundreds of such "add-ons"
widely marketed in this country for use with existing copyrighted
computer programs; spelling and grammar checking programs
designed to work in conjunction with word processing software
are common examples. Many of these "add-on" programs are
designed to alter the audiovisual output of the copyrighted
software with which they work. Nintendo would condemn the
interaction of the underlying and the add-on programs for creat-
ing an infringing "derivative work". 219
In Nintendo, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court order
preliminarily enjoining Galoob from marketing "Game Genie", a
hardware device for altering the copyrighted audiovisual display
generated by a Nintendo game cartridge. According to the district
court, Nintendo likely would establish at trial that Game Genie cre-
ated an unauthorized derivative work of Nintendo's audiovisual dis-
play. 220 The appeals court found that at the very least Nintendo
219. Galoob's trial brief is reproduced in the Computer Industry Litigation Reporter,
published by Andrews Publication, May 15, 1991, at 13055-13096.
220. The Ninth Circuit explained the facts as follows:
Nintendo makes and sells the Nintendo Entertainment System, a home
video game system. To use the system, a player inserts into the system's con-
trol deck a cartridge containing one of the games that Nintendo produces or
licenses others to produce. The game is then displayed on a connected televi-
sion screen. By moving buttons and a joystick on the controller, the player
controls the actions of one of the game's characters and progresses through the
video game.
The Game Genie is a hardware device manufactured by Galoob that can
be attached to a game cartridge before it is inserted into the Nintendo control
deck. The Game Genie allows the player to alter certain features of the
Nintendo game by choosing up to three codes from a large number of Game
Genie codes. For each of the codes entered by the player, the Game Genie
blocks the value for a single data byte sent by the game cartridge to the central
processing unit in the Nintendo controller and replaces it with a new value.
For example, if the cartridge sends a data byte setting the number of lives for
the player's character at 3, the Game Genie might, depending on the codes
chosen by the player, substitute the value 6, thereby giving the character 6 lives
rather than 3 in which to complete the game. The player can also change the
color of certain features of the audiovisual display, change the speed at which
the character moves, allow the character to float above obstacles and alter myr-
iad other features of the Nintendo game.
The Game Genie makes no change in the data stored in the game car-
tridge. Its interception and substitution of data takes place only as long as it is
attached to the game cartridge and the controller's power is on. The individual
changes that the user makes through entering codes therefore alter the audiovi-
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raised a substantial question on the merits, justifying the grant of a
preliminary injunction. However, after a full bench trial, the dis-
trict court issued a two-sentence order modifying the preliminary
injunction to allow Galoob to begin manufacturing and assembling,
but not marketing, Game Genie and stating that "[a] full and final
Order and Memorandum of Decision setting forth the Court's find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, and dissolving the preliminary
injunction in its entirety, will issue in the near future."22 Because
of the shotgun defense trial strategy adopted by Galoob in which
Galoob argued countless grounds for holding its actions non-
infringing, it is not possible at this time to know whether the final
decision will be consistent with or contrary to the decision in Mid-
way, and whether the decision will provide comfort or strike fear in
the hearts of those active in the software industry.222
K. Databases: Death of the "Sweat Of The Brow" Theory
Of Copyright Protection
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co.,223 is a copy-
right infringement case recently decided by the United States
Supreme Court which has considerable potential ramifications in
the area of software copyrights.
Rural was a public utility providing telephone service to per-
sons in a single telephone service area in Kansas. Persons applying
for telephone service from Rural submitted an application including
their names and addresses. Rural assigned each person a telephone
number, and then published a telephone directory including white
pages listing in alphabetical order the name, town and telephone
number of each subscriber. Feist published a directory covering
many telephone service areas, one of which was Rural's service
area. For all practical purposes, it can be said that Feist copied
Rural's white pages listings into the white pages of its directory.
Rural sued Feist for infringement of Rural's copyright in its direc-
tory. The district court granted summary judgment to Rural, hold-
ing that telephone directories are copyrightable and that Rural's
sual display temporarily but do not change it or the Nintendo game
permanently.
Id., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS at 1160.
221. The July 8, 1991 two-sentence order is set out in the Computer Industry Litigation
Reporter, published by Andrews Publication, July 17, 1991 at 13350.
222. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd 704 F.2d
1009, 218 U.S.P.Q. 791 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
223. 111 S.Ct. 1282, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1275 (1991).
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copyright had been infringed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court holding, but the Supreme Court reversed.
According to the Supreme Court, the source of Congress'
power to enact copyright laws is Article I, section 8, clause 8, of the
Constitution, which authorizes Congress to "secure for limited
Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings."224 The author of a work is the person who originates the
work. Thus, there is a constitutional requirement that a work be
original. Original in this context has two elements. The first ele-
ment is independent creation. The work must be independently cre-
ated by the author as opposed to copied from other works. But the
work need not be new or novel. It can resemble another's work as
long as such resemblance is not the result of copying. The second
element is creativity. The work must possess at least some modi-
cum of creativity. However, even a slight amount of creativity will
suffice. This originality requirement is codified in section 102(a)
which provides that copyright protection subsists in "original works
of authorship."
Facts do not originate with and thus, are not created by any
author. Facts already exist; they are merely discovered and re-
corded. Thus, no one can claim a copyright in facts. This principle
is codified in section 102(b) which provides that "[i]n no case does
copyright protection... extend to any... discovery," including the
discovery of facts. Thus, the names and related information in Ru-
ral's directory were uncopyrightable facts. Rural merely gathered
such facts and recorded them in its directory. These facts did not
originate with Rural. Feist, therefore, was free to copy such facts.
It would not matter if Rural had expended significant time and
money gathering such facts. The Supreme Court repudiated cases
which had afforded copyright protection to facts merely because of
one's "industrious collection" of the facts known as the 'sweat of
the brow' theory of copyright protection. Therefore, Feist was free
to copy the facts in Rural's directory.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that one can express facts in
an original way and thus, claim a copyright in her original form of
expression. One remains free to copy the facts but not the expres-
sion of those facts. Here, Rural did not express the facts, names
and related information, in an original way, it merely listed them in
its directory. Rural added no written expression but rather let the
facts speak for themselves.
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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The Supreme Court further recognized that if one selects, coor-
dinates or arranges facts in an original way, he/she may claim copy-
right in such selection, coordination or arrangement. This is
codified in sections 101 and 103(a) which provide that "the subject
matter of copyright.., includes compilations"22 which is "a work
formed by the collection and assembly of preexisting materials or of
data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that
the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of au-
thorship." '226 Thus, a compilation requires that the facts be "se-
lected, coordinated, or arranged" in an original way. One remains
free to copy the facts but not another's selection, coordination or
arrangement of those facts. This is codified in section 103(b) which
provides that "[t]he copyright in a compilation.., extends only to
the material contributed by the author of such work, as distin-
guished from the preexisting material [facts] employed in the work,
and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material
[facts]." '227 However, the selection, coordination, and arrangement
of Rural's white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional
standards for copyright protection. Rural selected all of its sub-
scribers and thus, did not exercise creativity in that regard. Rural
selected only the most basic information about each subscriber-
name, town, and telephone number-and such selection lacks the
modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection into
copyrightable expression. Rural arranged the subscribers alphabeti-
cally by surname. But arranging names alphabetically in a white
pages directory is not creative. It is instead the de facto standard-
so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of
course. In short, in preparing its white pages, Rural simply takes
the data provided by its subscribers and lists it alphabetically by
surname. Rural's selection and arrangement of facts was so
mechanical and routine as to require no creativity whatsoever. The
end product is a garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of
even the slightest trace of creativity.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that Feist copied only unpro-
tectible facts and an unprotectible arrangement of those facts. That
was permissible under the copyright laws. Indeed, the Supreme
Court went so far as to say that such copying was "encouraged,"
stating:
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor
225. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a).
226. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
227. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
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may be used by others without compensation. As Justice Bren-
nan has correctly observed, however, this is not "some unfore-
seen byproduct of a statutory scheme." It is, rather, "the essence
of copyright," and a constitutional requirement. The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but
"to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8. To this end, copyright assures authors the right to
their original expression, but encourages others to build freely
upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work. This princi-
ple, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy,
applies to all works of authorship. As applied to a factual compi-
lation, assuming the absence of original written expression, only
the compiler's selection and arrangement may be protected; the
raw facts may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor
unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the
progress of science and art .... [Case citations omitted.]22
1. Application To Computer Databases
Databases are essentially a compilation of facts. In many cases
there may be creativity in the selection of facts for use in the
database or in the arrangement of the facts within the database.
But that cannot prevent others from copying the facts. Moreover,
in many applications there would be insufficient originality (creativ-
ity) in the selection and arrangement process thereby completely
denying copyright protection to the database and encouraging law-
ful, wholesale copying of the database. One example that immedi-
ately comes to mind are mailing list databases which firms actively
market for profit. A company engaged in mass marketing software
encloses a registration or warranty card with each package of
software. The purchaser sends back the card with his name and
address. The seller places the name and address in a database.
There may be no more creativity in the selection and arrangement
of the data than was so in the white pages of Feist. The database
could be copied wholesale. While other databases might evidence
greater creativity in the expression of facts that would still not pre-
clude others from taking those facts, expressing them in an original
way, and distributing a competing database at a fraction of the de-
velopment cost incurred by the original author. Thus, while many
have predicted the imminent birth of the CD ROM reference
database revolution, the Feist case might delay, if not completely
abort, that event. At a minimum, CD ROM database distributors
228. Feist, at 1289-90.
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will likely look much more closely at contractual and trade secret
protection for their property. The computer industry has certainly
lost no time predicting the impact of the Feist decision. For exam-
ple, the author of an article in a Southern California Computer
Magazine opined that "[t]his ruling will have a great impact on the
still-fledgling database publishing industry, probably causing many
companies that were going to publish large amounts of data to think
twice.
229
L. Contributory Infringement Of Database Copyright By
Allowing Downloading
In Telerate Systems, Inc. v. Caro,230 plaintiff Telerate provided
computerized financial information to subscribers. Telerate pro-
vided access to its database through a proprietary network accessed
using either a terminal licensed from Telerate or using the sub-
scriber's own personal computer configured with proprietary
software licensed from Telerate. Defendants marketed a computer
program called Excel-A-Rate for configuring a personal computer
to access the Telerate database. Excel-A-Rate provided additional
features including the capability of downloading data from the
database onto disk. Telerate sued for copyright infringement and
moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting further distribution
of Excel-A-Rate. The Court held that plaintiff was likely to succeed
at trial on the merits of its copyright claim and granted the
injunction.23'
It was true that defendants did not copy the database or any
portion thereof and, therefore, had committed no act of direct in-
fringement. However, defendants provided purchasers of Excel-A-
Rate with the capability of copying the database, or at least a por-
tion thereof. Thus, defendants were charged with contributory in-
fringement. The Court agreed finding that Excel-A-Rate had no
substantial non-infringing use by applying Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc. 2 32 That is because the only uses of Excel-A-
Rate require the user to first copy (transmit) a portion of the
229. Hoffman, Industry Insight, Supreme Court Rules On Databases, New Workstation
Standards Association Formed, MICROTIMES, April 29, 1991.
230. 689 F. Supp. 221, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1740 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
231. The Court also held that Telerate was likely to succeed at trial on the merits of its
other claims, namely, interference with contracts between plaintiff and its customers which
essentially excluded the use of personal computer with Excel-A-Rate as the terminal; misap-
propriation of plaintiff's trade secret in the database; and violation of the Telecommunica-
tions Act. Id. at 240.
232. 464 U.S. 417, 220 U.S.P.Q. 665 (1984).
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database to his personal computer. The Court found such practice
not to be exempted from infringement under the "fair use" doctrine
applied in Sony.
M. Infringement By Copying Another's Database Pagination
In West Pub. Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc.,233 West published
its West Reporters containing decisions decided by various courts.
Attorneys cited these cases to courts by reference to the page
number in a given West volume containing the case. If an attorney
needed to cite to a particular statement made in a decision, the at-
torney would again cite the page number in the West volume where
the statement was made. West also had an electronic database with
the same cases. The database was logically arranged the same as
the volumes, so an attorney could use the electronic database with-
out needing to resort to the volumes to determine correct page and
volume numbers for his citations.
MDC was a competing publisher having the same cases, which
were in the public domain, in its Lexis database. MDC planned to
implement a Star Pagination Feature in which not only would each
case in the Lexis database include the page number where the case
begins in the West Reporters (something which MDC had always
done and West conceded was a fair use-most likely because West
wanted the Lexis to have the first page so the user could then easily
look up the case in the West Reporter), but also a jump or pinpoint
cite for each page of the case. The case in Lexis would have each
page numbered from 1 to n corresponding to the page breaks in the
West Reporter, so a user viewing page i of the case in Lexis would
know that such page corresponds to a page in the West Reporter
corresponding to the first page (which Lexis supplies) plus i. Theo-
retically, a user could sit at the Lexis terminal and page through
what corresponds to a complete West Reporter page-by-page.
West sued for copyright infringement. The district court
granted a preliminary injunction against MDC's use of the Star
Pagination Feature and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. According to
the Eighth Circuit, West had shown a likelihood that it had a valid
copyright in the arrangement of its cases which reflects sufficient
originality and that by indicating the West page numbers through
the jump cite, MDC had appropriated this arrangement.
The case is of doubtful validity after the Supreme Court deci-
233. 616 F. Supp. 1571 (D. Minn. 1985), aff'd 799 F.2d 1219, 230 U.S.P.Q. 801 (8th Cir.
1986).
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sion in Feist. MDC had argued that its Star Pagination Feature did
not infringe West's copyright because its citations to page numbers
are statements of pure fact. The Eighth Circuit rejected that argu-
ment relying on a telephone directory case holding that while en-
tries in directory, names, addressees and phone numbers, are facts
such that isolated use of these facts is not copyright infringement.
Copying each and every listing is an infringement. Feist effectively
overruled such telephone directory cases.
N. Possible Infringement By Copying A Command Set or
Computer Language
It remains an open question as to whether a computer language
itself, as opposed to a particular implementation of the language,
constitutes copyrightable subject matter. One commentator sug-
gests that a computer language is not copyrightable because if the
functions which the computer performs are uncopyrightable, so
should be the case for labels for such functions (e.g., Print, Go To)
under the merger doctrine as there is only a limited number of ways
of expressing such functions.234 But that is not accurate. First,
while there may be only a limited number of labels for each function
(a limited number of ways of expressing each command), a language
involves much more. For example, it involves the permissible argu-
ments, or operands, and their order. There are an unlimited
number of commands in that sense. Moreover, there are unlimited
combinations of command labels which together define the lan-
guage and such might be copyrightable as a compilation of terms.
The same scholar suggests that a computer language is not copy-
rightable because it is not a computer program within the meaning
of the Copyright Act. A computer program is defined in section
101 as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." A
computer program is thus written in a computer language, but the
language is not the program. While that may be true, it does not
end the matter. The language can still be copyrightable as a literary
work or as a compilation. The definition of a computer program
was not added so as to eliminate elements of a computer program
from copyright protection, but rather only to make clear that a
computer program itself was copyrightable.
234. Sumner & Lundberg, Patentable Computer Program Features As Uncopyrightable
Subject Matter, 17 AIPLA Q. J. 253-54 (1989).
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1. Pre-Computer Cases
At least one pre-computer case arguably stands for the propo-
sition that the elements of a computer language are copyrightable
subject matter, separate and apart from a user interface. In Reiss v.
National Quotation Bureau,235 the plaintiff sued for infringement of
its copyright under the 1909 Copyright Act in a book containing
6,325 coined words of 5 letters each. The words had no meaning,
but were all susceptible of pronunciation. They were carefully pre-
pared in accordance with the requirements of the telegraph compa-
nies to serve as a cable code, and the book was sold to those who
might make use of it as a private code by agreeing upon meanings to
be given to as many of the coined words as they chose. The defend-
ant brought a motion to dismiss the complaint. The motion was
denied in an opinion by Learned Hand. The defendant argued that
a series of coined words is not a writing of an author as the Consti-
tution uses that word. The court stated that if the list of coined
words was not such a writing, then the complaint must be dis-
missed. Otherwise it would stand. The defendant argued that the
word list could only be a writing if the words had meaning. The
Court disagreed and held that the collection of coined terms consti-
tuted copyrightable subject matter and allowed the complaint to
stand. In making its decision, the Court indicated that a person
could obtain copyright protection for an original "set of words or
symbols [devised] to form a new abstract speech" or for an original
mathematical language.236 Applying the reasoning of Reiss, it may
235. 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
236. The pertinent passage of the court's opinion is as follows (emphasis added):
These words have a prospective meaning, but as yet they have not re-
ceived it, like an empty pitcher. Suppose some one devised a set of words or
symbols to form a new abstract speech, with inflections, but as yet with no mean-
ing, a kind of blank Esperanto. The case would be approaching the plaintiff4
though not there, because the words would, indeed, express relationship. Mathe-
matics has its symbols, indeed a language of its own, Peanese, understood by
only a few people in the world. Suppose a mathematician were to devise a new
set of compressed and more abstract symbols, and left them for some conven-
tional meaning to be filled in. Still we would not be quite at the plaintiff's
words, but again we should not be far away. The distinction is real, but for
practical purposes seems to me irrelevant.
Not all words communicate ideas; some are mere spontaneous ejacula-
tions. Some are used for the sound alone, like nursery jingles, or the rhymes of
children in their play. Might not some one, with a gift for catching syllables,
devise others? There has of late been prose written, avowedly senseless, but
designed by its sound alone to produce an emotion. Conceivably there may
arise a poet who strings together words without rational sequence - perhaps
even coined syllables - through whose beauty, cadence, meter, and rhyme he
may seek to make~poetry. Music is not normally a representative art, yet it is a
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be argued that a computer language, like a telegraph language, an
abstract language, and a mathematical language, is eligible for copy-
right protection. In Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l,2 3 7
the district court suggested that it might be receptive to that very
argument.
2. The Lotus Case
In Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l,238 the defend-
ants argued that languages, such as English and French, are not
copyrightable, only text written in the language is copyrightable ex-
pression, and that computer languages should be treated the same
way. The computer language is not copyrightable, only programs
(set of statements or instructions) written in the language are copy-
rightable expression. The Lotus 1-2-3 macro-instruction language
was a computer language and, therefore, not protectable and could
be copied. Since the Lotus macro-instructions were in essence
memorized, or recorded, keystrokes typed using the user interface,
the only way to use the macro language was to have the same user
interface.239 Therefore, the user interface was dictated by the un-
protectible macro language, and it too could be freely copied. In
dicta, the court strongly indicated that when confronted with the
issue head on, it would find computer program languages to be
copyrightable, relying in part on the Reiss decision. 2" Specifically,
the court found defendants' argument to be vulnerable in several
particulars, most notably defendants' claim "[tihat not only lan-
guages such as English and French but all other languages as well-
including Esperanto, and Reiss' coined words..., and Pascal-are
"writing". There are meaningless rhymes - e.g., "Barbara Celarent" which
boys use in their logic, or to remember their paradigms or the rules of gram-
mar.
Works of plastic art need not be pictorial. They may be merely patterns,
or designs, and yet they are within the statute. A pattern or an ornamental
design depicts nothing; it merely pleases the eye. If such models or paintings
are "writings", I can see no reason why words should not be such, because they
communicate nothing. They may have their uses for all that, aesthetic or prac-
tical, and they may be the productions of high ingenuity, or even genius.
Therefore, on principle, it appears to me no reason to limit the Constitution in
any such way as the defendants require. Id. at 718-19.
237. 740 F. Supp. 37, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577 (D. Mass. 1990).
238. Id.
239. The court correctly pointed out that the second half of this argument was spurious.
The defendants could have written a conversion program to convert Lotus 1-2-3 macro-in-
structions into commands for their own user interface, as others had done. Id. at 69.
240. Id. at 72.
[Vol. 7
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR SOFTWRE
automatically ineligible for copyright protection." '2 4 1 But there are
cases which appear contrary to the dicta of Lotus, such as Ashton-
Tate Corp. v. Ross.242
3. Ashton-Tate
InAshton-Tate Corp. v. Ross,243 the court found that "All Ross
gave to ... [the programmer] was a list of commands he thought
should be included in the program" and "Ross merely told ... [the
programmer] what tasks he believed the interface should allow the
user to perform." The court concluded that "[tihe list of com-
mands is only an idea that is not protected under federal law."
Thus, Ross was not a joint author of the interface as he contributed
no protectable expression. Under Ross, therefore, a list of computer
commands corresponding to various defined tasks is not protectable
expression. However, others may seek to distinguish Ross on the
grounds that the court may have based its conclusion in part on a
belief that the command list and possibly also the associated tasks
were not original to Ross since the court had earlier noted that Ross
contributed "a list of labels for user commands, many of which are
common commands that were already available on other software
programs" and that "[t]here was nothing innovative or novel about
the labels that Ross proposed ... or the order in which they are
listed on the document." Arguably, the decision is predicated on a
finding that the command list was not original, not that a command
list cannot be copyrightable. 2"
0. No Infringement For Copying Typefaces
Copyright Office regulations provide that "mere variations of
typographic ornamentation [or] lettering" are not copyrightable
and will not be registered.24 In Eltra Corp. v. Ringer,246 the Court
upheld the Copyright Office's refusal to register a typeface design as
a useful article, concluding that "it is patent that typeface is an in-
241. Id.
242. 728 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd 916 F.2d 516, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1541 (9th
Cir. 1990).
243. Id.
244. Ross appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916
F.2d 516, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1541 (9th Cir. 1990). On appeal, Ross reiterated his argument that
"the handwritten list of user commands... was a fixed expression of Ross' ideas," but the
Ninth Circuit held that argument to be "meritless for the reasons given in the district court's
order"; to wit, "[t]he list simply does not qualify for copyright protection." Id. at 521-22.
245. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1990).
246. 579 F. 2d 294, 198 U.S.P.Q. 321 (4th Cir. 1978).
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dustrial design in which the design cannot exist independently and
separately as a work of art."
This issue settled, the Copyright Office recently announced
that digital data, in any form (e.g., "bitmapping", "outlining" and/
or "stroke definition"),"4 7 for producing an uncopyrightable type-
face on a display device, such as a computer display screen, printer
or other output device, also is not copyrightable and therefore not
registrable.248 According to the Office, the data that merely trans-
forms an analog visual representation of a typeface or letterform
into a digital electronic typefont or letterform is determined by the
ultimate shape of the typeface character and requires little, if any,
selection and arrangement. Therefore, the creation of the data lacks
sufficient originality to qualify as a an original work of authorship
subject to copyright protection. However, the Copyright Office was
careful to note that computer programs that control the digitization
process may be registrable. But the Office also stated that "the
claim to copyright must exclude any data that merely depicts the
typeface or letterforms."
In 1990, the Copyright Office approved copyright registration
for Adobe Systems Inc.'s ITC Grammond font-generating com-
puter program, one of Adobe's PostScript typeface programs. This
is believed to be the first copyright registration for a typeface pro-
gram allowed by the Copyright Office. The registration, TX-396-
004, protects the program that generates the characters in the type-
face but does not extend to the typeface designs generated or the
shapes of the individual characters. Adobe specifically disclaimed
protection for the underlying typeface characters in its copyright
application.
247. The Copyright Office explained that there are basically three techniques applied to
represent character digitally:
(1) bitmapping in which a dot-by-dot representation of each character is stored in elec-
tronic memory and directly used to print or display the character;
(2) outlining in which lines or curves define the boundaries of typeface characters, and
an outline font program instructs a computer or printer logic to fill in the outline of the
character (e.g., if a laser printer is used, the beam sweeps from side to side or up and down
within the boundaries of the letter, filling in the bounded area with dots that will show up as
solids on the paper or screen); and
(3) stroke definition in which characters are represented like the strokes of a pen or
brush following the path of a straight or curved line, and the computer operator must define
the characteristics of the pen or brush, such as what occurs at corners and stroke endings,
and ultimately, these descriptions must be converted into bitmaps.
A digitized typeface could be prepared by bitmapping alone, but it is more common to
use a combination of the three techniques to improve the quality of the typeface.
248. 53 FR 38110, Copyright Office Docket No. 86-4, September 29, 1990.
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P. Infringement By Exceeding The Scope Of A License
In S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday Inc.,24 9 the Ninth Circuit Court held
that a software copyright licensee can infringe the copyright in the
licensed software if the licensee's use of the software exceeds the
scope of the license. In S.O.S., the license authorized use of the
copyrighted software not the making of multiple copies of the
software nor the preparing of a modified version of the software.2"'
Q. Trying To Avoid Infringement By Showing Similarities
Necessary For Compatibility Or Do To Certain
Hardware Or Other Constraints
When faced with a charge of infringement, the defendant often
argues that while there are similarities to the copyrighted program,
those similarities were necessary due to certain constraints. Typi-
cally, the defendant avers that the idea is software satisfying the
constraints and, therefore, any aspect of the copyrighted software
necessary to meet the constraints is not protectable under the
merger doctrine discussed above.251 While occasionally such an ar-
gument has been successful, most often it has been met with sum-
mary rejection since the idea is defined broadly disregarding the
desire to satisfy the constraints.
1. Economic Feasibility As A Constraint
In Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machines
Corp.,252 the court held that copying from a program is not excused
merely because without such copying it would not be economically
feasible to create more original code. The economic feasibility of
developing code without such copying was simply not a relevant
consideration. The idea of the copyrighted program was unrelated
to the defendant's desire to develop an economically feasible
alternative.253
249. 886 F.2d 1081, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1989).
250. Id. at 1089.
251. See Section l(a), supra p. 209-10.
252. 746 F. Supp. 520, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1817 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
253. The court stated, in toto:
Whether it would be economically feasible for AMI to write its own program
to perform the 3092 processor controller functions without copying any of
IBM's 3090 microcode [note 10 omitted] is not relevant to the idea/expression
distinction. Otherwise, a computer program so complex that vast expenditures
of time and money would be required to develop a different program expres-
sing the same idea would not be protected, even if innumerable different pro-
grams expressing that idea could be written, while a simpler program requiring
less significant expenditures of time and money might be protected. So long as
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2. The Task Of The Software As A Constraint
In Plains Cotton Cooperative v. Goodpasture Computer Ser-
vice,254 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to pre-
liminarily enjoin defendant from marketing a computer program
alleged to infringe plaintiff's copyright in its cotton market infor-
mation program. According to the Fifth Circuit, while the two pro-
grams had a similar sequence, organization and structure, "many of
the similarities ... are dictated by the externalities of the cotton
market" and the "record supports the inference that market factors
play a significant role in determining the sequence and organization
of cotton marketing software, and we decline to hold that those pat-
terns cannot constitute 'ideas' in a computer context. ' 255 In other
words, in this case, the structure and organization was an unpro-
tectible idea which defendant was free to copy.
3. The Hardware On Which The Software Runs As A
Constraint
In NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp.,256 Intel alleged that its copyrights
in its 8086 and 8088 microcodes were infringed by the microcode of
NEC's V20-V50 microprocessors. In holding that infringement was
lacking, the court emphasized that similarities dictated by hardware
constraints and the macroinstruction set would be insufficient to es-
tablish substantial similarity.257 In essence the court filtered out
such similarities in making its determination.2 58 "Intel [had] con-
tend[ed] that NEC could have created a microprocessor compatible
with Intel's 8086/88 by using 'different hardware, different architec-
other expressions of the idea are possible, a particular expression of the idea
can enjoy copyright protection, regardless of whether a copying party possesses
the resources to write a different expression of the idea. Id. at 533.
254. 807 F.2d 1256, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635 (5th Cir. 1987), cert denied 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
255. Id. at 1262.
256. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
257. The Court following NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.03[A] at 13-33 to 13-34m con-
cluded that once the requirement of originality has been met, whether there has been merger
(and if so, to what extent) goes to the issue of infringement, not copyrightability." The Court
recognized that:
Although Ninth Circuit cases have not specifically discussed this issue raised
by NEC, they appear uniformly to treat the "merger" issue as a question of
whether or not there is infringement rather than copyrightability. Id. at 1179.
(Citing Data East USA v. EPYX, No. 87-2294, slip op. at 6 (9th Cir. Nov. 30,
1988); Frybarger v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp, 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir.
1987); Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742
(9th Cir. 1971)).
258. See Section l(a), supra p. 209-10.
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ture, different specifications and a different microinstruction for-
mat.' ,259 However, because NEC lawfully duplicated the Intel
hardware,"e the court concluded that "Intel is in no position to
challenge NEC's right to use the aspects of Intel's microcode that
are mandated by such hardware." '261 Further, since there were only
an extremely limited number of ways to express certain short mic-
rosequences because of the hardware constraints, substantial simi-
larity would not be found absent identical or verbatim copying,
which was not the case.262
4. Compatibility With Other Software As A Constraint
In Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Intl.,263 the defend-
ant urged that its spreadsheet program would not be commercially
viable unless it copied the user interface and macro language of the
leading spreadsheet program, Lotus 1-2-3. Without such copying,
users would not willingly switch to defendant's product because
they would have to be retrained on how to use the product and
could not use their existing spreadsheets and macros created using
Lotus 1-2-3.2 64 The court rejected that argument concluding that
"even if... [defendant's program] would have been a commercial
failure, and even if no other technological ways of achieving macro
and menu compatibility existed, the desire to achieve 'compatibility'
or 'standardization' cannot override the rights of authors to a lim-
ited monopoly in the expression in their intellectual 'work.' "265
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,266 the de-
fendant contended that it had to copy Apple's operating software
into the operating system software of its Apple-compatible com-
puter "in order to ensure 100% compatibility with application pro-
grams created to run the Apple computer" 267 and "to enable .. [its]
computer to run the vast body of Apple-compatible software.
268
The court was unpersuaded, holding that whether copying is neces-
sary to "achieve total compatibility with independently developed
application programs for the Apple II" is not relevant because such
compatibility "is a commercial and competitive objective" not rele-
259. Id. at 1188.
260. To the extent the hardware was patented, Intel had granted NEC a license.
261. NEC, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1188.
262. Id at 1188.
263. 740 F. Supp. 37, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577 (D. Mass. 1990),
264. Id at 69.
265. Id
266. 714 F.2d 1240, 219 U.S.P.Q. 113 (3rd. Cir. 1983).
267. Id. at 1245.
268. Id. at 1253.
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vant to the copyright laws.269
In Atari Games Corp. and Tengen, Inc. v. Nintendo of America,
Inc. and Nintendo Co., Ltd.,270 Nintendo sold its enormously popu-
lar Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) in which video game
cartridges are played on a game console. Non-Nintendo cartridges
cannot be used with an NES console because such cartridges are
missing a copyrighted program called 1ONES which communicates
with the same program in the console. Atari, however, developed
and used in its cartridges a program called Rabbit which was func-
tionally equivalent to the 1ONES program. Nintendo sued Atari
alleging that the Rabbit program infringed Atari's copyright in the
1ONES program. Atari argued that the unprotectible idea of
1ONES was a program capable of being played on the present NES
console and any future variation to the 1ONES program in the con-
sole. Thus, under the merger doctrine, Atari could copy any ex-
pression in the 1ONES program which was necessary to ensure
such continued compatibility or functionality, or that which was
"absolutely necessary to [the Rabbit's] intended purpose of render-
ing the Atari Games' slave chip functionally indistinguishable from
the Nintendo slave chip. '2 71 The court disagreed. The court noted
that there was authority for finding that the idea of 1ONES was as
broad as "quality control for a computer," in which case the copy-
ing was clearly beyond that which was necessary to express the
idea.272 But the court declined to define the idea with specificity,
holding simply that whatever the idea was, it did not include com-
patibility or functionality with future versions of the NES console.
"The Court declines to accept the theory that Atari was entitled to
copy more extensively from a copyrighted work so as to preempt
efforts to recognize and reject its unauthorized cartridges. ' 2 73 "The
'purpose' of being indistinguishable from a copyrighted item is not
one recognized in law."2 74 "Things that are admittedly non-
269. Id. (note that the court was rejecting the argument raised by the defendant that the
idea and expression had merged if copying was required to achieve compatibility).
270. 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5519, 24 Copy L. Rep. (CCH) 126,703 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
271. Id
272. The court, referring to Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., stated:
In Whelan, a dental prosthetics business contracted for a program to assist
with its bookkeeping. The court found that "the idea [was] the efficient organi-
zation of a dental laboratory." 797 F.2d at 1240. Anything more specific than
that was therefore protectable expression. [q In the instant case, a compara-
bly broad view of the program's idea might be 'quality control' for a computer.
Id
24 Copy L. Rep. (CCH), at %26,703.
273. Id
274. Id. The court cited Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., (competitor's goal
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functional at the time of copying are not made functional by the
infringer's efforts to preempt reactions to its infringement." '275
Once the court rejected Atari's definition of the idea, the conclusion
that infringement existed was inevitable, based on admissions previ-
ously made by Atari.276
5. Commentary
As NEC and Plains Cotton demonstrate, there are instances in
which constraints will be considered in determining infringement.
But if the constraints are real there would generally be no need to
copy constrained code from the copyrighted program. Implement-
ing a stringent clean room procedure wherein the programmers
work with a functional specification identifying the constraints will
serve a developer well. Any resulting similarities will be a direct
result of the constraints, not from copying. Infringement will turn
on a determination of whether the developer was entitled to write
code consistent with the constraints and need not also involve an
evaluation as to whether what the developer copied was truly neces-
sary to avoid running afoul of the constraints.
R. The Right To Copy Code As Part Of The Development
Of "Independent," "Non-Infringing" Code
One common step in the process of developing a program com-
patible with a copyrighted program is copying the copyrighted pro-
gram into a computer and generating and studying a disassembled
listing of that program in order to completely understand its func-
of total compatibility with Apple products does not affect the question of merger). The court
had earlier discussed E F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., in which the court stated:
To the extent that defendant premises its idea/expression contentions on the
bare facts that compatibility with the [copyrighted] system was its objective, its
arguments must be rejected.
Id.
275. Id. The court did make certain broader statements, but they appear to be dicta.
For example, the court stated:
Atari is free to develop a lockout program for its own video game machines.
Nintendo cannot copyright that idea. By contrast, Atari is not free to appro-
priate Nintendo's specific technique for "locking" its own game console.
Id.
276. The court noted that "Atari does not dispute that it could have copied less of the
1ONES program to obtain a functioning 'key' program." Id "Atari decided to make its
cartridges 'functionally indistinguishable' from Nintendo's own games by admittedly copying
more than was needed to make a game work on the [existing] NES console." Id Thus,
Nintendo had shown a likelihood of proving infringement at trial, and the court granted
Nintendo's motion for preliminary injunction.
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tionality. The making of that initial copy constitutes an infringe-
ment unless there is some recognized exception.
1. Judicially-Based Exceptions
A few cases have indicated that copying for reverse engineering
purposes is permissible without setting forth any statutory basis
therefor. For example, in E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of
America,277 the court, though finding that defendant had infringed
plaintiff's copyright, validated reverse-engineering of code as one
step in the development of an independent compatible program,
stating that "dumping and analyzing competitors' programs is a
standard practice in the industry" and "[h]ad Uniden contented it-
self with surveying the general outline of the EFJ program, thereaf-
ter converting the scheme into detailed code through its own
imagination, creativity and independent thought, a claim of in-
fringement would not have arisen" since "defendant may have per-
missibly dumped, flow charted, and analyzed plaintiff's code...""'
Another case in which copying for reverse engineering was
sanctioned is NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp. 279 In NEC, NEC admitted
that the writer of its microcode for its V20/V30 microprocessors
had previously studied a disassembled listing he had made of Intel's
copyrighted microcode for its 8086/88 microprocessors. In a pre-
liminary version of the NEC microcode, several microsequences
were "almost identical" or "very similar" to its counterpart in the
Intel microcode and the court assumed that such was because of
direct copying using the disassembled listing of the Intel microcode.
However, the NEC programmer rewrote those microsequences in
the final version of the microcode version so that the result was
code no longer substantially similar to its Intel counterpart. The
court noted that "NEC's final version of the challenged microcode
... [is] the only one against which a claim of infringement may be
277. 623 F. Supp. 1485, 228 U.S.P.Q. 891 (D. Minn. 1985).
278. The full quote is:
The mere fact that defendant's engineers dumped, flow charted, and analyzed
plaintiff's code does not, in and of itself, establish pirating. As both parties'
witnesses admitted, dumping and analyzing competitors' programs is a stan-
dard practice in the industry. Had Uniden contented itself with surveying the
general outline of the EFJ program, thereafter converting the scheme into de-
tailed code through its own imagination, creativity and independent thought, a
claim of infringement would not have arisen.... While defendant may have
permissibly dumped, flow charted, and analyzed plaintiff's code, it could not
permissibly copy it. Id. at 1501 n.17.
279. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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directed."2 ' The court provided no explanation as to why the ini-
tial copying was permissible. Instead, the court relied on prior deci-
sions holding that a defendant may avoid infringement by
intentionally making sufficient changes in a work which would
otherwise be regarded as substantially similar to that of the plain-
tiff's.281 While that may technically be true, it misses the mark.
Unless otherwise excepted, the initial copying would be an infringe-
ment and the plaintiff might then be entitled to a recovery based on
defendant's sales of the final version developed using the infringing
copy since profits on sales of the final version would arguably be
"attributable to the [initial] infringement" and losses suffered by the
copyright owner would arguably be "as a result of the [initial]
infringement." '282
In NEC, NEC later developed a clean room version of its
microcode apparently not at issue in the lawsuit. In determining
the alternative ways of writing the code to accomplish the function
of the subject microcode, the court considered NEC's clean room
microcode and concluded that "[t]he Clean Room microcode con-
stitutes compelling evidence that the similarities between the NEC
microcode and the Intel microcode resulted from constraints" and
thus such similarity was insufficient to establish substantial similar-
280. Id. at 1186.
281. The Court stated:
In See v. Duran, the court affirmed the granting of summary judgment for the
defendant, the opinion of the court noting that the plaintiff had sought to ob-
tain "early drafts of defendant's play on the theory that they might reflect
copying from plaintiff's play that was disguised or deleted in later drafts.
Copying deleted or so disguised as to be unrecognizable is not copying." See
also Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., in which the opinion observed
that "'a defendant may legitimately avoid infringement by intentionally mak-
ing sufficient changes in a work which would otherwise be regarded as substan-
tially similar to that of the plaintiffs'."' Id. at 1186-87.
282. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) provides that "[tihe copyright owner is entitled to recover the
actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the
infringer that are attributable to the infringement and not taken into account in computing
the actual damages." This would be analogous to the situation encountered in Robert R.
Jones Assoc., Inc, v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1224 (6th Cir. 1988). In Nino
Homes the defendant infringed plaintiff's copyright in its architectural plans by copying those
plans. The defendant built homes in accordance with the copied, infringing plans. The
homes built by defendant were not an infringement of plaintiff's copyright since a home is a
"useful article" which defendant is free to make and use; it is not copyrightable subject mat-
ter. Nevertheless, the Court held that "the damages recoverable by the copyright owner
include the losses suffered as a result of the infringer's subsequent use of the infringing cop-
ies" Id. at 280. The Court held that but for the initial infringement plaintiff would have sold
the homes instead of defendant and, therefore, awarded plaintiff the profit it would have
made on such sales.
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ity and infringement.283 In so ruling, the court commented that
"[t]he Clean Room microcode was governed by the same con-
straints of hardware, architecture and specifications as applied to
the NEC microcode, and copying clearly was not involved." '284
This comment is significant because it lends further support to the
concept that intermediate copying is permissible as that was a step
in development of the clean room microcode.285
2. Statutory-Based Exception: 17 U.S.C. § 117(1)
In developing its computer program, the defendant in Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd.8 6 purchased the plaintiff's copy-
righted program and copied it into computer memory to analyze
how it operated. The plaintiff alleged that such copying violated its
copyright. However, the court held that such copying was permis-
sible under 17 U.S.C. section 117(1) which provides that "it is not
an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to
make... another copy.., of that computer program provided...
283. NEC, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1188.
284. Id
285. Id The full passage of the decision relating to the Clean Room microcode is as
follows:
The Clean Room microcode constitutes compelling evidence that the simi-
larities between the NEC microcode and the Intel microcode resulted from
constraints. The Clean Room microcode was governed by the same con-
straints of hardware, architecture and specifications as applied to the NEC
microcode, and copying clearly was not involved. Mr. McKevitt, who created
the 8086 microcode for Intel, readily acknowledged that the microarchitecture
of the 8086 microprocessor affected the manner in which he created his
microcode, and that he would expect that another independently created
microcode for the 8086 would have some similarities to his. [Record citation
omitted.] Accordingly, the similarities between the Clean Room microcode
and the Intel microcode must be attributable largely to the above mentioned
constraints. But the similarities between the Clean Room microcode and Rev.
2 are at least as great as are the similarities between the latter and the Intel
microcode. This is made evident by an examination of Exhibit 705. The
strong likelihood follows that these similarities, also resulted from the same
constraints.
Mr. McKevitt also acknowledged that he would expect that independently
created microcode for the 8086 would have fewer similarities in the longer
sequences than in the shorter sequences because "there is more opportunity for
the longer sequences to be expressed differently." [Record citation omitted.]
This is exactly what occurred here; the longer sequences in Rev. 2 and Intel's
microcode are not nearly so much alike as are the shorter sequences.
In light of the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that the same con-
straints, rather than copying, were responsible for the principal similarities be-
tween Rev. 2 and the Intel microcode. Id.
286. 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987), aff'd 847 F.2d 255, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1281 (5th Cir.
1988).
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that such a new copy.., is created as an essential step in the utiliza-
tion of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and
that it is used in no other manner .... ." The plaintiff had argued
that section 117(1) should be limited to making a copy of a program
as an essential step in the utilization of the computer programfor its
intended purpose, not for an unintended purpose such as making a
copy to develop another program. The court rejected that argu-
ment because "Section 117(1) contains no language to suggest that
the copy it permits must be employed for a use intended by the
copyright owner."2 7 It should be noted that the section 117(1) ex-
ception is an affirmative defense and, therefore, the defendant bore
the burden of proving applicability of the exception.2"' Thus, Vault
articulates a statutorily-based legal exception, section 117(1), which
permits copying as an essential step in reverse engineering one's
own code, thereby, insulating the final version of the code developed
using the copied program.
a. But The Statutory Exception May Not Extend
To Making A "Hardcopy" Of The
Copyrighted Program
There was no evidence in Vault that the defendant ever made
any copy of the copyrighted program other than the copy inputted
into the computer's memory. The only issue presented was the le-
gality of copying the copyrighted program into computer memory
to analyze the manner in which the program operated. 28 9 There
was no evidence that the defendant "ever made a physical copy of
[the copyrighted program]."'290 Thus, it remained an open question
whether making a hardcopy for analysis or a disassembled listing,
would be permissible. That question was answered in Allen-
Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp.291
Allen-Myland centered around the microcode for IBM's 3090
mainframe computer systems. The 3090 mainframes included
many different models. An individual 3090 computer system could
be reconfigured into a different model or could be split into two
287. Id at 261.
288. See Allen-Myland v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 535-36, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1817 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
289. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, 847 F.2d 255, 257 & 261, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1281 (5th
Cir. 1988).
290. The district court decision explains that "There was no evidence introduced that
Quaid has ever made a physical copy of PROLOK which could be sold or loaned to others."
Id. at 755.
291. 746 F. Supp. 520, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1817 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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lower performbance 3090 computer systems. In order to reconfigure
or split a 3090 computer system, it was necessary to change the
system hardware and the copyrighted system microcode. On re-
quest, IBM sold new microcode versions to existing customers de-
siring to reconfigure or split their systems. AMI was engaged in the
business of reconfiguring and splitting 3090 computer systems for a
fee. For use in reconfiguring and splitting systems, AMI compiled a
library of 3090 microcode tapes by making unauthorized copies of
3090 microcode and, where necessary, creating modified versions of
the copied microcode to fit a particular need sometimes by combin-
ing code from a number of original microcodes.2 92 To reconfigure
or split a customer's machine, AMI would thus copy a version from
its library onto its customer's machine.
The Allen-Myland court held that AMI's copying and adapting
"to accumulate a library of the 3090 microcode, or to make copies
of the 3090 microcode for reconfigured or split 3090 systems," was
not done as "an essential step in the utilization of the computer
program [microcode]. 293 Relying on the CONTU Final Report294
and prior precedent,295 the court concluded that section 117(1) per-
mits only the copying of a program into a computer's memory in
order to permit the computer to execute the program. The court
opined that the Fifth Circuit in Vault 296 "held only that § 117(1)
permits the loading of a program into a computer's memory even if
the program was then analyzed in memory for a purpose unin-
tended by the copyright owner. ' 297 That might be a fair reading of
Vault and of the statute which provides "that such a new copy or
adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the
292. For example, from tapes ordered from IBM or supplied by a computer leasing
company, or supplied with systems made available to AMI by customers for whom it was
performing a reconfiguration or split.
293. Allen-Myland, 746 F. Supp. at 536.
294. The CO$TU Final Report, supra note 16, stated at 13 with reference to section
117(1):
Because the placement of a work into a computer is the preparation of a copy,
the law should provide that persons in rightful possession of copies of pro-
grams be able to use them freely without fear of exposure to copyright liabil-
ity.... One who rightfully possesses a copy of a program, therefore, should be
provided with a legal right to copy it to that extent which will permit its use by
that possessor. This would include the right to load it into a computer...
295. See Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 34-35, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1210
(D. Mass. 1984) ("In our opinion, [section 117(1)] refers to the placement of a program into a
computer - or, in the jargon of the trade, the 'inputting' of it.... The permission to copy
stated in subsection (1) is strictly limited to inputting programs.").
296. Vault, 847 F.2d at 261.
297. Allen-Myland, 746 F. Supp. at 536.
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computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used
in no other manner." Nevertheless, the Allen-Myland court should
have limited its holding to the conclusion that "[t]he Vault Court
did not address the type of copying in which AMI has engaged, i.e.
making copies on tape and on a hard disk to build a library of differ-
ent versions of the program and to supply with a computer other
than the one with which the program originally was supplied."29
Such copying is certainly contrary to the express language of the
statute which provides that:
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of
this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along
with the copy from which such copies were prepared, only as
part of the lease, sale or other transfer of all rights in the pro-
gram. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the
authorization of the copyright owner.
2 99
That was not being done by AMI. AMI was not transferring the
original copy with its library copy to anyone. The original copy
was frequently returned to its source. Or, if the original copy was
that of its customer, the library copy was maintained by AMI.
A case relied upon by the Allen-Myland court was Micro-
Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp.3" The plaintiff in Micro-Sparc sold a
computer magazine including a listing of certain computer pro-
grams. Plaintiff authorized magazine purchasers to type the com-
puter programs into their machines or to purchase for a fee
diskettes containing such programs for input into their machines.
Defendant typed the programs into a machine, stored them on a
master diskette, and sold copies to magazine purchasers at a price
far less than plaintiff was charging. Plaintiff sued for infringement
of the copyright in the programs. Defendant argued that its con-
duct was authorized under section 117(1). Defendant asserted that
the purchaser was the owner of a copy of the computer program in
the magazine and could type the program into his machine as "an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program." That
was not disputed. Defendant further argued that the purchaser
could authorize defendant to make the diskette copy for inputting
into his computer. The court might have agreed that -the purchaser
could authorize defendant to type the copy into his computer as "an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program," but the
court held that the purchaser could not authorize the prior making
298. Allen-Myland, 746 F. Supp. at 536.
299. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
300. Micro-Sparc, 592 F. Supp. at 34-35, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1210 (D. Mass. 1984).
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of a diskette version which was not "an essential step in the utiliza-
tion of the computer program." According to the court, "[i]n our
opinion, [section 117(1)] refers to the placement of a program into a
computer-or, in the jargon of the trade, the 'inputting' of it....
The permission to copy stated in subsection (1) is strictly limited to
inputting programs."301 Thus, while section 117(1) might authorize
the typing into a computer by defendant on behalf of a purchaser, it
did not authorize the initial making of a diskette copy.
b. The Interplay With The Archival Exception of
§ 117(2) And The Court's Strained Attempts
To Limit The Applicability Of The § 117
Exceptions
The defendant in Micro-Sparc sought to rely on the archival
exception of section 117(2) for the making of the diskette copy.3" 2
But the court held that while section 117(2) would allow the pur-
chaser to make an archival disk copy of the typed in program to
prevent the typed-in copy from "destruction or damage by mechan-
ical or electrical failure," "[s]ubsection (2) does not, however, per-
mit the purchaser to authorize the defendant to put Nibble
programs on disks for archival purposes."303 According to the
court, a customer who lawfully types in to make a copy under sec-
tion 117(1) can make a backup archival copy under section 117(2)
to prevent the typed in copy from "destruction or damage by
mechanical or electrical failure." 3" But here, "the purchaser has
not first created a 'destructible' or 'damageable' copy" since the
only copy he had was the hardcopy in the magazine.3"5 Thus, the
disk copy made by defendant was not to prevent "destruction or
damage by mechanical or electrical failure" of a legally made copy.
The court is applying convoluted reasoning. The purchaser
had the right under section 117(1) to input a copy into its computer
as an essential step in the utilization of the program. Defendant did
that for the purchaser through a multi-step process-type it into his
own computer, copy it on disk and provide it to customer for input.
301. Micro-Sparc, 592 F. Supp. at 35.
302. 17 U.S.C. § 117(2) provides that "Notwithstanding the provisions of § 106, it is not
an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the
making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:... (2) that such
new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are de-
stroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be
rightful.
303. Micro-Sparc, 592 F. Supp. at 35.
304. Id.
305. Id
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The purchaser had the right to make a disk copy under section
117(2) to protect against destruction of the typed in copy. Defend-
ant did that as well-the original disk copy. What the court really
objected to was the ease by which defendant could engage in the
profitable business of making archival copies and machine copies of
the copyrighted program for all purchasers of plaintiff's magazine,
thereby eating away at plaintiff's profits from sales of diskette ver-
sions of the programs. After all, the defendant only had to type up
the program once rather than typing up the program for each maga-
zine subscriber contracting for the defendant's services.
c. Other Substantial Limitations On The
Exercising Of Your § 117(1) Statutory Right
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc.,3 °6 the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of preliminary in-
junction to plaintiff Apple against defendant Formula relating to
alleged copyright infringement of two operating system computer
programs for the Apple II Computer which Apple claimed were
infringed by Formula's two operating system computer programs
for the Formula Pineapple Computer. Subsequently, the district
court found Formula to be in contempt of the preliminary injunc-
tion for buying floppy diskettes with the two Apple programs from
an authorized Apple licensee, copying the program into ROMs on a
one-to-one basis, one program on a diskette to one ROM with the
program without multiple copies, and selling computers and com-
puter kits with the ROMs.307 According to the district court,
although 17 U.S.C. section 117 would allow copying of the pro-
grams "as an essential step in the utilization of the computer pro-
gram in conjunction with a machine" as well as for archival
purposes, that right is a personal right limited to the possessor/
Formula and thus, did not authorize copying for resale to allow a
third party purchaser to use the computer program.
308
306. 725 F.2d 521, 218 U.S.P.Q. 47 (9th Cir. 1983).
307. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 224 U.S.P.Q. 560
(C.D. Cal. 1984).
308. The Court concluded:
The Court extracts from these authorities these principles concerning Section
117:
1) Only an owner-user of a computer who rightfully owns a copy of the copy-
righted program is authorized to make another copy of that program, and this
copying must be necessary for him to use the copyrighted program in his com-
puter; 2) The copy authorized by Section 117 must be made only for the
owner-user's internal use and must be destroyed when the original copyrighted
1991]
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The court further found that copying of the diskette was not
"an essential step in the utilization of the computer program," and
thus section 117 was inapplicable because the diskette could be used
directly with the computer-temporarily copied into RAM for ac-
tual use-rather than permanently copied into ROM. Copying into
ROM was not an essential step in the utilization of the program.
According to the court, "the type of copying must be nor more per-
manent than is reasonably necessary" since "'[e]ssential' means in-
dispensable and necessary."
3. Statutory-Based Exception: 17 U.S.C. § 107
In 4llen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machines
Corp. ,309 AMI also argued that its copying activities were permissi-
ble under 17 U.S.C. section 107. Section 107 provides that the fair
use (e.g., copying) of a copyrighted work (e.g., computer program)
is permissible and does not constitute copyright infringement and
lists four factors to be considered in whether the use (e.g., copying)
is a fair use.310 However, all four listed factors militated against a
finding of fair use.31 Nevertheless, AMI argued that its copying
activities were a form of reverse engineering which, though not
listed as a factor in section 107, should be a permissible fair use
under the statute. The court recognized that factors other than the
four listed could be considered but elected not to determine whether
copying for reverse engineering was a fair use under section 107.
Instead, the court rejected AMI's fair use contentions because
"[t]he evidence presented establishes that AMI in fact has not en-
work is resold; (3) The copy thus made by the owner-user cannot be made
accessible to others.
Id at 621-62.
309. 746 F. Supp. 520, 534-35, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1817 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
310. 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies .... for purposes such as
... research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is afair use the factors to be consid-
ered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
311. Specifically, (1) the copying was for commercial purposes; (2) the copyrighted
microcode was more creative than informational; (3) either all or a large portion of the copy-
righted microcode was copied; and (4) IBM lost revenue as a result of AMI's activities.
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gaged in reverse engineering .... 312
In view of the foregoing, it remains an open question whether
copying for reverse engineering may be a fair use immunized from
liability under section 107 even though application of all four statu-
torily listed factors militate against a finding of fair use. It should be
noted here that the fair use exception, like the section 117(1) excep-
tion, is an affirmative defense and, therefore, the defendant bears the
burden of proving applicability of the exception.313
4. Atari/Nintendo: Maybe Reverse Engineering Code
Is No Longer Legal
In Atari Games Corp. and Tengen, Inc. v. Nintendo ofAmerica,
Inc. and Nintendo Co., Ltd.,314 Nintendo argued that Atari in-
fringed its copyright program copyright by making direct machine
code copies of its copyrighted program and a pseudo-source copy
therefrom. These copies were intermediate and used to develop
what Atari would contend was a non-infringing, independent pro-
gram for sale in Atari products. Atari argued that this reverse engi-
neering was permissible to enable one to read and use the ideas in
the program. The court entered an order on or about March 27,
1991, holding that Nintendo had shown a likelihood of proving at
trial that such intermediate copying constituted copyright infringe-
ment and enjoining further intermediate copying. The court also
found the final version to likely be infringing.
On April 1, 1991, Atari moved to modify the original injunc-
tion order to allow such intermediate copying presumably so as to
permit Atari to redevelop its program using an adequate clean room
procedure, resulting in a non-infringing program which it could sell
in its products. However, in the court's amended opinion and order
entered April 11, 1991, the court maintained its holding that
Nintendo had shown a likelihood of proving at trial that such inter-
mediate copying constituted copyright infringement, and continued
the clause of the injunction prohibiting such intermediate copying.
An open issue remains, however, whether the court would
have enjoined Atari's sale of the final product if it was non-
infringing or not substantially similar, as being the fruit of the un-
lawful intermediate copying. In the primary case relied upon by the
court for the proposition that intermediate copying is impermissi-
ble, the final product was itself infringing and therefore, the injunc-
312. Allen-Myland, 746 F. Supp. at 535.
313. Allen-Myland, 746 F. Supp. at 534.
314. 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5519, 24 Copy L. Rep. (CCH) 126,703 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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tion naturally extended to that product.31 5
If later courts disregard pre-Atari precedent, choosing instead
to follow the holding in Atari that intermediate copying is unlawful,
that could drastically effect the development processes of firms en-
gaged in the creation of compatible and clone software as their
clean room procedures would no longer provide a shield against a
copyright infringement claim. Moreover, programs already on the
market developed with such a clean room procedure and heretofore
immune from suit could be the target of attack from the maker of
the cloned software fearing the growing competition and hoping for
a windfall damage award to breathe new life into ailing balance
sheets.316
S. The Right To Adapt A Program For Internal Use-i 7
U.S.C § 117(1)
It is not all that uncommon for a business to purchase or li-
cense an expensive software package only to later realize that revi-
sions or enhancements are necessary for optimal use of the product.
Furthermore, since many businesses lack the programming exper-
tise to modify the program in-house, they must engage a program-
315. The court stated with reference to an argument made by Atari as to the correct
interpretation of SAS Ins. v. S&H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 225 U.S.P.Q. 916
(M.D. Tenn. 1985):
Further, the Court disagrees with Atari's reading of SAS Institute, supra.
Atari repeatedly asserts that SAS was limited to a finding at trial that the al-
leged infringer's final program was substantially similar to the copyrighted pro-
gram. Atari Mem. Opp. at 38 and 49. In fact, the court in SAS explicitly
addressed the intermediate copying argument. SAS Institute had alleged that
"in the course of preparing its product, S & H made an unknown number of
unauthorized, and thus infringing, exact copies of some or all of the SAS
source code." Id., at 828. The court had ruled on this argument in SAS's
favor on a motion for partial summary judgment, "subject only to proof of
validity of the copyright." Id. Validity having been established at trial, the
court "adopted and incorporated" unconditionally the findings of infringing
intermediate copying. Atari has not adequately addressed this point, thereby
suggesting Nintendo's likelihood of success on the merits regarding intermedi-
ate copying. S.4S, of course, is also adverse to Atari on the issue of a final
derivative work from a competitor's "targeted" program. Id. at 831.
24 Copy L. Rep. (CCH) 126,703.
In SAS, the court proceeded to find the end product to be an infringing derivative work
apparently because absent such a finding liability would not extend to the final product
notwithstanding the intermediate copying.
316. The defendants filed an appeal from the entry of the preliminary injunction, and the
district court entered an order on May 20, 1991, staying the injunction pending the appeal.
The stay was granted based primarily on evidence that the injunction would effectively put
defendant Tengen out of business, while Nintendo would sustain minimal harm if the injunc-
tions effect is delayed. Defendants were required to post a bond of $3,000,000.
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mer to do the modifications. Technically speaking, the end product
of such modifications is a new program which is a derivative of the
original, copyrighted program. But the copyright owner is granted
exclusive right "to prepare derivative works based upon the copy-
righted work." '317 Thus, absent some exception, the purchaser and
the programmer have combined to infringe the copyright in the
original program. However, 17 U.S.C. section 117(1) provides that
"it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer
program to make or authorize the making of... [an] adaptation of
that computer program provided... that such ... adaptation is
created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer pro-
gram in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other
manner." 318 Hence, the purchaser could lawfully authorize the
outside programmer to adapt the original program to meet his
unique needs provided the "adaptation" resulting therefrom was
only used internally. That was the court's holding in Foresight Re-
sources Corp. v. Pfortmiller.319
In Foresight, Hall-Kimball purchased Foresight's copyrighted
computer program called Drafix 1-+. Hall-Kimball engaged
Pfortmiller, a programmer, to add five new files to the program
thereby creating a derivative program which was called HK Digi-
tizer which was used by Hall-Kimbell solely in-house in connection
with its business. The court ruled that Pfortmiller's enhancement
of the Dralix 1 + program was an adaptation within the meaning of
section 117 and thus permissible.320
1. But Don't Combine Two Copyrighted Programs
In Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machines
Corp.,321 the court held that the adaptation right under section 117
was limited to adapting an individual program and did not extend
317. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). The term "derivative work" is defined in the 1976 Act as "a
work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation ... or any other form
in which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
318. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1).
319. 719 F. Supp. 1006, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1721 (DC Kan. 1989).
320. The copyright owner, Foresight, claimed that the making of the adaptation violated
the license agreement accompanying the Draft 1 + program. The Court cited the Vault case
as "some reason to question the enforceability of the provision in the Drafix 1 + licensing
agreement that prohibits enhancements." Foresight, 719 F. Supp. at 1010. In Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software, Ltd, 847 F.2d 255, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1988), the court held that a
shrink wrap license agreement was an unenforceable contract of adhesion. But even if the
provision preventing enhancements was unenforceable, other provisions of the license might
be valid and Hall-Kimball might still be a "licensee" of the software, not an "owner." If that
were the case, the literal language of section 117 would not be applicable.
321. Allen-Myland, 746 F. Supp. at 536-37, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1817 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
1991]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LNWJOURNAL
to making a modified program by combining code from two copy-
righted programs of the same copyright owner. According to the
Allen-Myland court:
But AMI's modified versions of the 3090 microcode are not ad-
aptations of the 3090 microcode permissible under section
117(1). The evidence establishes that AMI produces copies of
the 3090 microcode for use on reconfigured or split 3090 systems
by making rainbow copies from 3090 microcode copies taken
from various 3090 systems, or by making changes in the 3090
microcode provided with one 3090 system to produce a partial
duplicate of a copy from another system.... Such activity is not
permissible adaptation under section 117, since it produces modi-
fied 3090 microcode only by making partial duplicates of two or
more different versions of the 3090 microcode produced by
IBM.322
T. The Right To Make Archival Copies-17 US.C. § 117(2)
17 U.S.C. section 117(2) provides that "it is not an infringe-
ment for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or
authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that com-
puter program provided... (2) that such new copy or adaptation is
for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed
in the event that continued possession of the computer program
should cease to be rightful." Two recent cases explain some of the
metes and bounds of the rights granted by section 117(2).
In Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machines
Corp. ,323 the court applied a literal reading of section 117(2), stating
that it immunizes from infringement copies made "for archival pur-
poses only". That interpretation is consistent with the CONTU Fi-
nal Report which states that section 117(2)'s objective is to give the
rightful possessor of a computer program "the right.., to prepare
archival copies of it to guard against destruction or damage by
mechanical or electrical failure... [b]ut this permission would not
extend to other copies of the program. ' 324 Since the copies made by
AMI "performed functions in addition to archival functions," such
as being "actively operated [in] reconfigured or split 3090 systems,"
the copies fell outside of section 117(2).
In Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc. ,325 Atari sold a home com-
322. Allen-Myland, 746 F. Supp. at 537.
323. Allen-Myland, 746 F. Supp. at 537, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1817 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
324. CONTU Final Report, supra note 16, at 13.
325. 597 F. Supp. 5, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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puter video game with video game cartridges. The cartridge in-
cluded ROMs containing the video game program. Defendant sold
a machine for copying the contents of the ROMS into ROMs in a
blank cartridge. Defendant argued that the customer was author-
ized to make the copy under section 117(2) for archival purposes.
Therefore, the customer did not infringe and defendant could not be
guilty of contributing to the infringement. The court disagreed.
According to the court, relying on the CONTU Final Report, sec-
tion 117(2) was intended to give the rightful possessor of a com-
puter program "the right ... to prepare archival copies of it to
guard against destruction or damage by mechanical or electrical
failure... [b]ut this permission would not extend to other copies of
the program." '26 Thus, the exception is limited to computer pro-
grams which are subject to "destruction or damage by mechanical
or electrical failure." The court stated:
Where, and only where, a medium may be destroyed by mechan-
ical or electrical failure, the archival exception protects the own-
ers of programs stored in that medium by granting them the
right to make backup copies.3 27
The ROMs on the other hand, which cannot be reprogrammed or
erased, were subject only to physical failure similar to a paper me-
dium, but not mechanical or electrical failure. Thus, section 117(2)
was not applicable.
U. "Owner" Versus "Rightful Possessor" Under 17 U.S. C.
§ 117
17 U.S.C. section 117 speaks of the right of an owner of a copy
of a computer program to have a copy or adaptation made as an
essential step in the utilization of the program or for archival pur-
poses. The term owner does not literally cover a licensee. Of
course, a court may reach the conclusion after applying accepted
principles of statutory construction that the term owner should be
interpreted broadly so as to include licensees. But such a conclu-
sion might be contrary to the legislative history and the intent of
Congress.
The language for section 117 was proposed by CONTU. The
proposed language was precisely adopted by Congress with one and
only one change. Congress, without explanation, inserted the word
owner for the term rightful possessor proposed by CONTU. One
326. CONTU Final Report, supra note 16, at 13.
327. Atari, 597 F. Supp. at 9.
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could readily argue that this change indicated a Congressional in-
tent to limit section 117 to owners of copies of a computer program,
not other rightful possessors such as licensees.
In Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machines
Corp.,328 discussed above, it was not clear whether the defendant
AMI or those for whom it provided services had purchased or li-
censed IBM's microcode for its 3900 series computer system. Thus,
an issue was whether AMI or those for whom it provided services
was a owner of the microcode within the meaning of section 117. If
neither was an owner, AMI had no direct rights to adapt the
microcode, and the customer had no right to authorize AMI to
adapt for its benefit. The court ducked the issue, however, stating
"[b]ecase... I find that AMI's copying does not fall within either
of the two definitions of permissible copying in section 117, I do not
decide the[se] questions .... ,329
V. Right To Authorize Under 17 U.S.C. § 117
In Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machines
Corp. ,330 discussed above, the court indicated that even if a cus-
tomer of IBM was the owner of the IBM microcode and thus, had
an adaption right under section 117, there was still a question
"whether the parties for whom AMI performs engineering services
may delegate any rights they may have to copy or adapt under
§ 117 to AMI. ' 33 1 However, as to the customer's individual copies,
the question is answered by the language of the statute itself. "It is
not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program
to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of
that computer program ......
VI. AFFRMATiVE DEFENSES
A. Fraud On The Copyright Office Defense To An
Infringement Claim
17 U.S.C. section 410(c) provides:
In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made
before or within five years after first publication of the work shall
constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright
and of the facts stated in the certificate. The evidentiary weight
328. 746 F. Supp. 520, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1817 (E.D.Pa. 1990).
329. Id. at 536 n.15.
330. 746 F. Supp. 520, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1817 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
331. Id. at 536 n.15.
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to be accorded the certificate of a registration made thereafter
shall be within the discretion of the court.
This presumption of validity is rebuttable.332 In increasing num-
bers, defendants charged with infringement seek to rebut the pre-
sumption by showing that the copyright owner committed a fraud
on the Copyright Office through inaccuracies, usually material mis-
statements or omissions, in its application for registration. The
well-settled law has been that the presumption of copyright validity
may not be overcome on the basis of fraud on the Copyright Office
without proof that inaccuracies in the copyright application were
intentional.333 Prejudice to defendant from the alleged fraud is also
a prerequisite.334 That is, "[a]bsent intent to defraud and prejudice,
inaccuracies in a copyright registration do not bar actions for
infringement. 335
A straightforward application of these principles is found in a
recent Ninth Circuit case, S. .S. Inc. v. Payday Inc. 336 The defend-
ant in S.O.S. alleged that plaintiff committed fraud on the Copy-
right Office in its initial application for copyright registration when
it identified itself as the sole author when in fact the software in-
cluded programs prepared by another. The district court granted
defendant summary judgment on its fraud defense. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit explained that a fraud
on the Copyright Office defense must fail absent proof that the
copyright applicant intentionally made misstatements or omissions
in the application with an intent to defraud the Office and proof that
defendant was prejudiced as a consequence of the alleged fraud.
Applying these principles, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment because defendant failed to
show both that the omission was done intentionally with an intent
to defraud and that it was prejudiced by the omission. Despite the
clearly enunciated standard for a fraud on the Copyright Office de-
332. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097, 1104 (N.D. Cal.
1991) (citing Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 908, 208 U.S.P.Q. 10 (2d
Cir. 1980), and Past Pluto Productions Corp. v. Dana, 627 F. Supp. 1435, 228 U.S.P.Q. 919
(S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
333. Id (citing Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 222 U.S.P.Q. 762 (2d Cir.
1984) and S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1086 n.5, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (9th Cir.
1989) (the inaccuracy must have been done intentionally with an intent to defraud and the
defendant must have been prejudiced)).
334. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d J329, 1333, 22 U.S.P.Q. 466 (9th Cir.
1984); S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1086, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1989).
335. Harris, 734 F.2d at 1333, 222 U.S.P.Q. 466 (quoted with approval in S.O.S., 886
F.2d at 1086, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241).
336. 886 F.2d 1081, 1086, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1989).
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fense, there appears to some confusion in applying that standard as
the following two recent district court cases demonstrate.
1. Ashton-Tate
In Ashton-Tate Corporation v. Fox Software, Inc.,3 Ashton-
Tate marketed its enormously popular line of dBASE programs.
The editions, in chronological order, were dBASE II (there was no
dBASE I), dBASE III, DBASE III PLUS and dBASE IV, with
each edition being an improvement to its immediate predecessor.
Ashton-Tate had applied for and received a certificate of copyright
registration for each edition. However, several of the certificates
were inaccurate. Most notably, the dBASE III was a derivative
work of dBASE II. The application and the resulting registration
should therefore, have stated this and claimed that the copyright
registration was only for revisions and additions, not for preexisting
material from dBASE II. However, the application and the regis-
tration failed to mention dBASE II and the derivative status of
dBASE III, and claimed that the registration was for the entire
work. Also, none of the registrations indicated that the subject pro-
gram was a derivative work of an earlier public domain program
called JPLDIS.338 When Ashton-Tate sued Fox for copyright in-
fringement, Fox countered with a claim that the copyrights were
invalid and unenforceable as a result of Ashton-Tate's fraud or in-
equitable conduct in procuring the applications. The court agreed
entering an order on December 11, 1990 granting Fox's motion for
summary judgment on the issue, dismissing Ashton-Tate's claims,
and declaring invalid all of Ashton-Tate's copyrights on its dBASE
line of programs.
337. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Fox Software, 760 F. Supp. 831 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (order inval-
idating copyrights); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Fox Software, 760 F. Supp. 831, 832, 24 Copy. L.
Rep. (CCH) 126,714 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (order rescinding first order; only the CCH reporter
includes a declaration of the Register of Copyrights which may have influenced the judge's
decision to rescind his first order). Each order is only a few lines. The facts are taken from
pleadings filed in the case.
338. 17 U.S.C. § 409 provides that "The application for copyright registration shall be
made on a form prescribed by the Register of Copyrights and shall included ... (9) in the
case of a... derivative work, an identification of any preexisting work or works that it is
based on or incorporates, and a brief, general statement of the additional material covered by
the copyright claim being registered." The copyright forms prescribed by the Register of
Copyrights have a place to include the identification of preexisting works from which a deriv-
ative work is based. Registration for a derivative computer program covers only the addi-
tions, changes, or other new material appearing in the program for the first time.
Compendium II, section 323.01 (1988). The copyright forms thus include a space for setting
out the Nature of Authorship which would be the entire work in most cases, but only revi-
sions for derivative works.
[Vol. 7
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR SOFTWARE
The Court finds that Ashton-Tate, when it filed its original appli-
cations for copyright, repeatedly failed to disclose material infor-
mation to the United States Copyright Office - that the dBase line
of computer software programs was derived from JPLDIS, a
public domain computer software program developed by the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, and that dBase III was derived form
dBase II. [1] The Court further finds that Ashton-Tate's re-
peated failure to disclose such material information was done
knowingly and with an intent to deceive. [%] The Court, there-
fore, finds that Ashton-Tate's copyrights on its dBase line of
computer software programs are invalid as a result of its inequi-
table conduct.339
The decision was suspect for a number of reasons. First, the court's
finding that the misstatements were made with an intent to deceive
does not appear supported by the record in the case. Second, the
court made no finding of prejudice to Fox which is a requirement
for establishing a defense of fraud or inequitable conduct on the
Copyright Office. Third, while failure to cite dBASE II in the
dBASE III application was clearly an error, failure to cite JPLDIS
may very well have not been error. The court made no finding that
dBASE II was a derivative work of JPLDIS, and the evidence indi-
cated that such was not the case. While a few commands were the
same in the two programs and while JPLDIS may have been the
inspiration for dBASE II, as the next case establishes, something
more is required before one can be considered the derivative work
of the other. Fourth, before the ruling, Ashton-Tate had applied for
and received supplemental registrations as was its statutory right,
34 °
correcting the errors and purporting to purge it of the alleged ineq-
uitable conduct. The court did not consider this in its order. Fifth,
the order purports to invalidate the copyrights thereby injecting the
programs into the public domain rather than merely invalidating
the copyright registrations which were the subject of the complaint
leaving the possibility of subsequent suits at least against third par-
ties for infringement based on the supplemental registrations. Sixth,
the order purports to invalidate copyrights in all the dBASE pro-
grams, even those programs adding significant independent copy-
rightable subject matter and for which there were no errors in the
registration.
According to papers Ashton-Tate filed with the district court,
the damage to Ashton-Tate from the court's ruling was enormous.
339. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Fox Software, 760 F. Supp. 831 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (order inval-
idating copyrights).
340. 17 U.S.C. § 408.
1991]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAWJOURNAL
The invalidated dBASE products are the company's principal assets
generating over $250 million in annual revenues, and they embod-
ied over seven years of original development by Ashton-Tate at a
cost of more than $150 million. The copyrights, previously upheld
in more than a dozen cases, are the only thing preventing others
from freely copying the programs. Ashton-Tate is currently a party
to nine other copyright infringement actions which may be decided
adversely to it in light of the order which it may be precluded from
attacking under principles of collateral estoppel. Moreover, less
than one week after entry of the order, Ashton-Tate was served
with a class action suit alleging Ashton-Tate overcharged its cus-
tomers because of its fraudulent copyright protection.
Ashton-Tate's motion for reconsideration or clarification of the
order, supported by a declaration from the U.S. Register of Copy-
rights and Assistant Librarian of Congress for Copyright Services
was denied. The court did grant, however, Ashton-Tate's motion to
certify the case for appeal under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b). 341
Ashton-Tate then filed a petition with the Ninth Circuit for permis-
sion to appeal under Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure. Fox opposed the petition. The Ninth Circuit denied the
petition. In a desperate attempt at appellate relief, in February
1991 Ashton-Tate initiated an appeal under 28 USC section
1292(a)(1) on the dubious theory that the district court's order was
tantamount to the denial of a preliminary injunction motion and in
mid-April filed a motion asking for summary reversal of the district
court's decision. 342 Then, without any prior indication to the par-
ties or their counsel, on April 18, the district court judge, with no
pending motions before him, entered an order stating tersely:
The Court, having considered Ashton-Tate's motion for recon-
sideration, together with the moving and opposing papers,
It is Ordered that Ashton-Tate's motion for reconsideration be,
and hereby is, Granted.
It is further Ordered that this Court's Order of December 11,
1990, be, and hereby is, Rescinded.
It is Further Ordered that Fox Software's motion for summary
judgment based on the affirmative defense of Ashton-Tate's ineq-
uitable conduct in its dealings with the United States Copyright
Office be, and hereby is, Denied.343
341. Fox's antitrust counterclaims prevented a final judgment from being entered.
342. At the time of this writing, the Ninth Circuit had yet to act on these filings.
343. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Fox Software, 760 F. Supp. 831, 832, 24 Copy. L. Rep.
(CCH) 26,714 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (order rescinding first order; only the CCH reporter in-
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The attorneys for Ashton-Tate advised this author that they have
no idea what prompted Judge Hatter to suddenly reverse himself
when there was no pending motion before him including a motion
for reconsideration since that motion had already been denied. 3"
The case will now proceed to trial where it is possible that the court
will have an opportunity to revisit the inequitable conduct defense




Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.346 was initiated when
Apple fied a copyright infringement action against Microsoft and
Hewlett-Packard claiming that Microsoft's Windows computer op-
erating system software and HP's NewWave computer application
software infringed Apple's copyrights in the visual displays of Ap-
ple's Macintosh computer graphic user interface. Apple's graphic
user interface consists of windows, icons, pull-down menus, and
other images or visual displays projected on the computer screen.
Apple filed a motion for partial summary adjudication that Apple's
audiovisual copyrights are valid and that the defendants' affirmative
defenses should be dismissed.
One such affirmative defense was fraud on the Copyright Of-
fice. The defendants contended that Apple's failure to disclose to
the Copyright Office that its works were based upon preexisting
works should overcome the presumption of validity of Apple's
copyright registrations. It was undisputed that the designers of Ap-
ple's graphic user interface were strongly influenced by the user in-
terface in certain Xerox programs, Smalltalk and Star, which used a
mouse, overlapping windows and icons. However, the court held
cludes the declaration of the Register of Copyrights which may have influenced the judge's
decision to rescind the first order).
344. There is speculation that the declaration from the U.S. Register of Copyrights and
Assistant Librarian of Congress for Copyright Services influenced the judge's decision to re-
verse his earlier ruling invalidating the Ashton-Tate copyrights. See Computer Industry Liti-
gation Reporter, published by Andrews Publication, June 5, 1991 at 13124-25 ("A
declaration by U.S. Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman is believed by sources to have influ-
enced Central District of California Judge Terry J. Hatter's decision to reverse his own posi-
tion and rescind a ruling that invalidated Ashton-Tate's dBASE software copyright
registrations."). The declaration is reproduced in Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Fox Software, 24
Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) T26,714 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
345. Moreover, at the time of this writing, Ashton-Tate had an appeal from the original
order still pending in the Ninth Circuit. While the Ninth Circuit is likely to dismiss the
appeal on motion by the parties or sua sponte, it is at least possible that the Ninth Circuit will
retain jurisdiction to decide the appeal.
346. Apple, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1104.
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that such borrowing of ideas does not deprive Apple's works of
their presumption of copyright validity. A designer of a computer
graphic user interface is not required to acknowledge sources of ar-
tistic influence. Such borrowing, according to the court, does not
render the Apple works a "derivative" of the Xerox works, and
therefore, failure to indicate a derivative status was not improper.
The court stated that defendants' "contention that Apple's copy-
righted works are derivative works is meritless." A derivative work
is one which is substantially copied from a prior work. A work will
be deemed a derivative work only if it would be considered an in-
fringing work if the material which it has derived from a prior work
had been taken without the consent of a copyright proprietor of
such prior work.347 All works are derived from preexisting works
to a certain degree. A derivative work within the meaning of the
copyright law, however, is one which substantially borrows the ex-
pression of ideas from an existing work. 48 Defendants provided no
evidence demonstrating that Apple's works could be considered to
have infringed Xerox's copyrights or that Apple's works substan-
tially borrowed expressions of ideas from Xerox's Smalltalk or Star
programs. Hence, Apple's failure to disclose the borrowed Xerox
material was inadequate to overcome the presumption of validity.
Furthermore, as stated above, absent intent to defraud and
prejudice, inaccuracies in copyright registration do not bar actions
for infringement.349 Defendants submitted no evidence of Apple's
intent to deceive the Copyright Office. Thus, that was another basis
on which the court could find that the presumption of validity had
not been rebutted.
As to the original Ashton-Tate decision, which had not yet
been rescinded, the court stated summarily:
The parties have recently sent letter briefs to the court regarding
the December 11, 1990 decision and order in Ashton-Tate Corp.
v. Fox Software, Ina, No. CV 88-6837 TJH (C.D. Cal. filed Dec.
12, 1990). HP relied on the legal conclusion that Ashton-Tate's
failure to disclose that its programs were derived from a com-
puter software program in the public domain invalidated
Ashton-Tate's copyrights on its dBase line of computer software
programs. [Footnote 15 omitted.] This court finds the two-page
Ashton-Tate decision unhelpful to the resolution of the pending
motions.
347. Litchfield v.Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357, 222 U.S.P.Q. 965 (9th Cir. 1984).
348. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.01.
349. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335, 222 U.S.P.Q. 466 (9th Cir.
1984).
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Finding no evidentiary basis for defendants' claim that Apple in-
tended to commit a fraud on the Copyright Office and finding that
the Apple visual displays are not derivative of the Xerox programs,
the court concluded that Hewlett-Packard failed to establish that
Apple perpetrated a fraud on the Copyright Office. The affirmative
defense was therefore dismissed.
B. Copyright Misuse As A Defense To An Infringement
Claim
With ever increasing frequency, defendants charged with copy-
right infringement are asserting the defense of copyright misuse.
They are receiving mixed results and terribly inconsistent treatment
from the courts.
1. Lasercomb
In Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,35 Lasercomb devel-
oped a program called Interact used in the manufacture of steel rule
die. Lasercomb licensed copies of its Interact program to Holiday
Steel. Holiday Steel made three unauthorized copies of Interact
which it used on its computer systems. Holiday Steel also created a
software program called PDS-1000, which was almost an exact du-
plicate of Interact, and marketed it as its own die-making software.
Lasercomb sued Holiday Steel for, among other things, copyright
infringement. In response, Holiday Steel asserted that the copy-
right was unenforceable because Lasercomb misused its copyright
by including in its standard licensing agreement, clauses which pro-
hibited the licensee from participating in any manner in the creation
of computer-assisted die-making software for ninety-nine years.351
At least one Lasercomb licensee had executed that standard license
agreement, but Holiday Steel was not one of them.
The district court found in favor of Lasercomb, rejecting the
350. 911 F.2d 970, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1846 (4th Cir. 1990).
351. The allegedly offending paragraphs read:
D. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement that it will not permit or
suffer its directors, officers and employees, directly or indirectly, to write, de-
velop, produce or sell computer assisted die making software.
E. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement and for one (1) year after
the termination of this Agreement, that it will not write, develop, produce or
sell or assist others in the writing, developing, producing or selling computer
assisted die making software, directly or indirectly without Lasercomb's prior
written consent. Any such activity undertaken without Lasercomb's written
consent shall nullify any warranties or agreements of Lasercomb set forth
herein.
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misuse defense. The Fourth Circuit reversed. It held that copy-
right misuse is a defense to a claim for copyright infringement just
as patent misuse is a defense to a claim for patent infringement. It
further held that Holiday Steel may raise the defense even though it
was not a party to the standard licensing agreement and, therefore,
was not itself injured by the misuse. Finally, it held that the chal-
lenged clauses constituted copyright misuse because they were
against public policy even if they were not violative of any antitrust
laws.
Lasercomb undoubtedly has the right to protect against copying
of the Interact code. Its standard licensing agreement, however,
goes much further and essentially attempts to suppress any at-
tempt by the licensee to independently implement the idea which
Interact expresses. The agreement forbids the licensee to develop
or assist in developing any kind of computer-assisted die-making
software. If the licensee is a business, it is to prevent all its direc-
tors, officers and employees from assisting in any manner to de-
velop computer-assisted die-making software. Although one or
another licensee might succeed in negotiating out the noncom-
pete provisions, this does not negate the fact that Lasercomb is
attempting to use its copyright in a manner adverse to the public
policy embodied in copyright law, and that it has succeeded in
doing so with at least one licensee. The language employed in
the Lasercomb agreement is extremely broad. Each time
Lasercomb sells its Interact program to a company and obtains
that company's agreement to the noncompete language, the com-
pany is required to forego utilization of the creative abilities of all
its officers, directors and employees in the area of CAD/CAM
die-making software. Of yet greater concern, these creative abili-
ties are withdrawn from the public. The period for which this
anticompetitive restraint exists is ninety-nine years, which could
be longer than the life of the copyright itself.
2. Atari
At issue in Atari Games Corp. and Tengen, Inc. v. Nintendo of
America, Inc. and Nintendo Co., Ltd.'52 was Nintendo's three-tier
program to prevent competition to its popular Nintendo Entertain-
ment System (NES). The first tier was technological. In the NES
and in the game cartridges used on the NES was a lockout security
system chip. The chip prevented independent software developers
352. The opinion in Atari Games Corp. & Tengen v. Nintendo of Am. & Nintendo Co.,
(N.D. Cal., March 5, 1991) is reproduced in the Computer Industry Litigation Reporter,
published by Andrews Publication, March 25, 1991, at 12781-90.
[Vol. 7
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR SOFTWARE
from developing game cartridges for NES. Thus, only Nintendo-
authorized games could be played on NES. The chip also prevented
NES game cartridges from being used on non-NES entertainment
systems and, therefore, Nintendo-authorized games could be used
only on NES.
The second tier was intellectual property. Nintendo had a pat-
ent on the chip and a copyright in the computer program in the
chip. The patents precluded others from overriding the technologi-
cal obstacles without running afoul of Nintendo's intellectual
property.
The third tier was contractual. Nintendo licensed third parties
to develop and market specific game cartridges for the NES. But
the license agreement prohibited the licensee from selling any other
games, other than the specific licensed games, for use on NES sys-
tems, and prohibited the licensee from selling the licensed games for
use on non-NES systems for a period of two years. Thus, while the
licensee was provided the technical capability to eliminate the tech-
nological obstacles and was given a license under the intellectual
property rights of Nintendo, he was contractually limited in what
he could do.
Atari developed, manufactured, and sold game cartridges for
use on NES without a license from Nintendo. Nintendo sued for
copyright and patent infringement. Atari asserted that the provi-
sion in Nintendo's license agreement prohibiting licensees from sell-
ing the licensed cartridges for use on non-NES systems constituted
patent and copyright misuse. Atari moved for summary judgment
on its misuse defense. The court denied the motion, rejecting the
misuse defense.
The court explained that 35 U.S.C. section 271(d) provides
that a patent owner has the right to license others or refuse to li-
cense others to sell non-staples used substantially only with its pat-
ented invention, something which has no substantial use other than
as a material part of a patented invention. Since, according to the
court the game cartridges were such a non-staple article, the license
agreement was authorized by the patent statute and did not consti-
tute patent misuse.
As to copyright misuse, the court noted that the Ninth Circuit
had not yet addressed whether or not misuse was a valid defense to
a copyright infringement claim. Assuming, without holding, that
the defense was available, the court held essentially that the princi-
ples in 35 U.S.C. section 271(d) were equally applicable to copy-
rights and therefore the copyright misuse defense would fail as well.
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To the extent that Lasercomb was inconsistent with section 271 (d),
"this Court declines to follow it." Further, the offending exclusivity
provision in Lasercomb was distinguishable. A misuse defense, if
one exists, requires conduct violative of the public policy embodied
in the copyright laws. In Lasercomb, the license prohibited the li-
censee from developing any software in a certain area for 99 years.
Those restrictions, unreasonable in both scope and duration, re-
strained the creativity of the licensees and thus violated the public
policy embodied in the copyright laws. Here, the license prohibited
the licensee from developing only specific games for only two years.
The licensee would be free to develop other games for other systems
and to sell the licensed games for other systems after two years.
The court thus concluded that "[t]he record does not demonstrate,
as a matter of law, that such restrictions restrain the creativity of
Nintendo licensees and thereby thwart the intent of the patent and
copyright laws." Hence, the defense, at least on the record then
existing, had to fail.
The court did note that a violation of antitrust law is not a
prerequisite of a patent misuse defense and, by analogy, the same
would be true for a copyright misuse defense assuming such did
exist. In this respect, the case is consistent with Lasercomb. The
copyright misuse defense, to the extent it exists, requires conduct
violative of the public policy embodied in the copyright laws even if
such conduct does not constitute an antitrust violation.
3. Allen-Myland
Lasercomb should be contrasted with Allen-Myland, Inc. v. In-
ternational Business Machines Corp.353 In Allen-Myland, AMI de-
fended a copyright infringement action by asserting that IBM had
misused its copyright in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The court rejected that defense on the ground that AMI had not
established an antitrust violation. The court also noted that while it
"need not address the question whether violation of the antitrust
laws can constitute a valid defense to a claim of copyright infringe-
ment,.., most courts which have addressed this question have held
that violation of the antitrust laws cannot provide a valid defense to
a copyright infringement claim."' 354 Thus, while the Lasercomb
court held that copyright misuse requires only that the copyright
owner's conduct violated the public policy embodied in the copy-
353. 746 F. Supp. 520, 531, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1817 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
354. The court cited NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.09[A], at 13-142 to 13-144, and cases
cited therein.
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right laws even though such conduct does not constitute an- anti-
trust violation and while the Atari court agreed assuming, without
holding, that copyright misuse is a valid defense to a charge of
copyright infringement, the Allen-Myland court held that if the de-
fense is available at all it requires that the copyright owner's con-
duct constitutes an antitrust violation.
VII. FURTHER, IMPORTANT RECENT EVENTS
A. Licensee Fraud
In Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,355 Lasercomb devel-
oped a program called Interact used in the manufacture of steel rule
die. Lasercomb licensed copies of Interact to Holiday Steel. Holi-
day Steel made three unauthorized copies of Interact which it used
on its computer systems. Holiday Steel also created a software pro-
gram called PDS-1000, which was almost an exact duplicate of In-
teract, and marketed it as its own die-making software. Lasercomb
sued Holiday Steel for, among other things, fraud "at the time they
sought to purchase a license to use the software at the Holiday
plant," by representing to Lasercomb that they would preserve
Lasercomb's copyright and proprietary rights in Interact. The dis-
trict court found that Lasercomb had established fraud by showing
that defendants made various false representations on which
Lasercomb reasonably relied in continuing its relationship with
Holiday Steel, giving the defendants the opportunity to make un-
lawful copies of the software. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
and awarded damages based on the fraud count.
B. Software Licensor "Self Help"
In Art Stone Theatrical Corp. v. Technical Programming & Sys-
tems Support, Inc.,35 6 Technical sold a computer system to Stone.
After a dispute over the performance of the software component of
the system, Technical removed the source code from the system
without Stone's knowledge or authorization. The parties then en-
tered into an agreement pursuant to which Technical returned the
source code to Stone in exchange for a general release. Stone then
sued Technical for breach of warranty and contract. Technical
moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the action was
barred by the release. Stone countered that the release was void
because it executed the release under duress. The lower court re-
355. 911 F.2d 970, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1846 (4th Cir. 1990).
356. 157 A.D.2d 689, 549 N.Y.S.2d 789 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1990).
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jected the duress contention, upheld the release and dismissed the
action. The appeals court reversed, sending the case back to the
lower court for a trial on the issue of duress.
The affidavit of the plaintiff's president in opposition to the mo-
tion to dismiss alleged that the wrongful removal of the source
code from the computer software system resulted in the disrup-
tion of the plaintiff's business, thereby leaving him no choice but
to accede to the defendant's demand and execute the general re-
lease in order to obtain the return of the source code. Inasmuch
as "[a] contract may be voided on the ground of economic duress
where the complaining party was compelled to agree to its terms
by means of wrongful threat which precluded the exercise of its
free will," the affidavit was sufficient to raise a factual issue with
regard to the plaintiff's claim of duress. Accordingly, a trial on
this issue is appropriate. [Citations omitted.]
C. Computer Software Rental Amendments
The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990 was
signed into law by President Bush on December 1, 1990. 357 The
Amendments have three separate features which pertain to the
rental of software, the use of coin-operated video games, and the
recordation of shareware in the Copyright Office.
1. Rental Of Software
Under 17 U.S.C. section 106(3), a copyright owner has the ex-
clusive right to "distribute copies ... of the copyrighted work by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."
But that right is limited by the first sale doctrine, codified in 17
U.S.C. section 109(a), which provides that "[n]otwithstanding...
section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy.., lawfully made...
is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy." Thus, a pur-
chaser of a copyrighted computer program may distribute it to
others without violating the copyright owner's copyright. 358 Sec-
tion 109(a), however, greatly concerned software copyright owners
who believed that software rental houses were purchasing a copy of
their software and then renting it out over and over again to hun-
357. The amendments were made under the Computer Software Rental Amendments
Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (December 1, 1990).
358. Note is made that "section 109 does not authorize adaptation and reproduction of a
copyrighted work." Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 745, 219 U.S.P.Q. 42
(N.D.III. 1983) (quoted with approval in Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int'l Business Machines Corp.,
746 F. Supp. 520, 538, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1817 (E.D. Pa. 1990)).
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dreds of end users without the copyright owner sharing in any of
the profits earned on the rentals. A further concern was that the
end users desiring to use the software long after it was returned,
would make unlawful copies of the software thereby denying the
copyright owner of sales he would have otherwise made to such
users.
In recognition of these legitimate concerns, 17 U.S.C. section
109(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act was amended.3" 9 The amend-
ments give the computer program copyright owner the right to pro-
hibit the "rental, lease, or lending" (rental) of the computer
program by others, specifically, anyone owning or in possession of a
particular copy of the program, for purposes of direct or indirect
commercial advantage.36 Rental of a program without the author-
ity of the copyright now constitutes copyright infringement.361 The
amendments to section 109(b) took effect on the date that they were
enacted into law-December 1, 1990.362 However, the amendments
are prospective and thus, have no impact on the rights of persons to
rent a copy of a computer program acquired before the effective
date of the amendments.3 63 Further, unless extended, the amend-
ments will not apply to rentals made after October 1, 1997.3€
There are three significant exceptions to the software rental
prohibitions of amended section 109(b). First, rental "for nonprofit
purposes by a nonprofit library or nonprofit educational institution"
is exempted.3 65 Second, rental of "a computer program which is
embodied in a machine or product and which cannot be copied dur-
ing the ordinary operation or use of the machine or product" is also
excluded.3 66 This exception was necessary to allow the rental of
machines which employ computer-programmed controls, such as
microwave ovens, automobiles, computers, and the like. Third, also
exempted is rental of "a computer program embodied in or used in
conjunction with a limited purpose computer that is designed for
playing video games and which may be designed for other pur-
poses."367 This exception was inserted at the behest of the Video
359. Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, § 802.
360. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (as amended).
361. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(4) (as amended).
362. Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, § 804(a).
363. Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, § 804(b).
364. Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, § 804(c).
365. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (as amended). The nonprofit library must, however, affix
a warning of copyright to qualify for the exception. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)(A) (as amended).
366. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(B)(i) (as amended).
367. 17 U.S.C. § 109(o)(1)(B)(ii) (as amended).
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Software Dealer's Association which desired to continue its practice
of renting home video game cartridges.
2. Use Of Coin-Operated Video Games
There is one other interesting amendment that was made to 17
U.S.C. section 109 which needs some further explanation. Under
sub-sections (4) and (5) of 17 U.S.C. section 106, a copyright owner
has the exclusive right to publicly perform and display a copy-
righted audiovisual work.3 61 Prior to the amendment to section
109, persons purchased coin-operated video games and placed them
in video arcades open to the general public. As the patrons played
the game, its copyrighted audiovisual images were performed and
displayed on a video screen. The courts held that the arcade owner
was violating the copyright owner's exclusive rights to publicly per-
form and display the audiovisual work and, thus, was infringing the
audiovisual copyright.36 9 It mattered not that the arcade owner
lawfully purchased the video game. That lawful purchase would
allow the arcade owner to distribute the video game since section
109(a)'s first sale doctrine provided an exception to the copyright
owner's exclusive distribution rights under section 106(3). But, ac-
cording to the courts, section 109(a) did not limit the copyright
owner's exclusive display and performance rights under sections
106(4) and (5).
To make legal conduct of the type engaged by the arcade
owner, a new subdivision (e) was added to section 109, providing
that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of sections 106(4) and
106(5), in the case of an electronic audiovisual game intended for
use in coin-operated equipment, the owner of a particular copy of
such a game lawfully made under this title, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner of the game, to publicly perform
or display that game in coin-operated equipment... 37 0 This new
368. Recall that audiovisual works are defined as "works which consist of a series of
related images, which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices
such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if
any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the
works are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
369. See, eg., Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d 1548 (4th Cir. 1989). The 1976 Act provides that a work is publicly performed or
displayed when done "at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gath-
ered." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Hence, purchasing a video game cassette and playing with it at
home within a small circle of family and friends would not violate the performance or display
rights of the copyright owner.
370. The new subdivision goes on to recite an exception, to wit: "except that this subsec-
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subdivision (e) takes effect on December 1, 1991, one year after the
amendments were enacted into law371 and, unless extended, will not
apply to public performances or displays occurring after October 1,
1995.372
3. Shareware Recordation
Finally, the Register of Copyrights was authorized to record
and provide a certificate of recordation with respect to shareware,
and to compile, periodically publish, and offer for sale, information
with respect to such recordation.373
D. Shrink Wrap Licenses
In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd.,3 copyrighted software
was mass marketed on diskettes together with a shrink wrap, or
bubble pack, license in accordance with the Louisiana Software Li-
cense Enforcement Act (SLEA). The SLEA authorized use of a
shrink-wrap license agreement which (1) provides that the pro-
ducer/licensor retains title to the software, (2) prohibits copying,
modifying, adapting, translating, reverse engineering, decompiling,
disassembling, and creating derivative works, (3) prohibits further
transfer, assignment, rental, sale or other disposition of the
software, and (4) provides for automatic termination without notice
of the license agreement if any of its provisions are breached. The
court held that the license agreement was an unenforceable contract
of adhesion and that the contract could not be saved by a Louisiana
statute authorizing such agreements since the statute was pre-
empted by the federal copyright laws. 375 Based on the absence of
subsequent shrink wrap cases, it is suspected that the software pub-
tion shall not apply to any work of authorship embodied in the audiovisual game if the copy-
right owner of the electronic audiovisual game is not also the copyright owner of the work of
authorship."
371. Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, § 804(a).
372. Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, § 804(c).
373. Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, § 805 (December 1, 1990).
374. 847 F.2d 255, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1988).
375. In actuality, the lower court made this ruling. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd.,
655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987). On appeal, the plaintiff only sought an injunction to
prevent defendant from decompiling or disassembling the computer program. Thus, as far as
the preemption issue was concerned, the appeals court only had to decide that the provision
in the Louisiana statute about decompilation and disassemble was preempted. Technically,
the appeals court did not have to decide whether the other provisions, like the one about
adaptation, would be preempted. See also, Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F.
Supp. 1006, 1011, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1721 (D. Kan. 1989) (court cited Vault as "some reason to
question the enforceability of any such [shrink wrap license] agreement.").
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lishers have chosen not to attempt to enforce such agreements, be-
lieving that a decision like that in Vault is probable.
E. Recording Security Interests In Copyrighted Works
17 U.S.C. section 205(a) provides that "[a]ny transfer of copy-
right ownership or other document pertaining to a copyright may
be recorded in the Copyright Office.. .". If certain conditions are
met, section 205(c) provides that such recordation gives "all per-
sons constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded docu-
ment." The recording is indexed by the title and registration
number of the work. Thus, a creditor acquiring a security interest
in a copyrighted film could record the security agreement with the
Copyright Office and a prospective purchaser of the copyright need
only search the indices maintained by the Copyright Office for that
work to determine whether the copyright is encumbered. A draw-
back of this system is that when the creditor acquires a security
interest in many copyrighted works such as a film library which
adds new films over time, the creditor must make a separate filing
for each film and the prospective purchaser must separately search
the indices for each film. This is costly and time consuming.
On the other hand, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
adopted with or without modification in virtually all states, provides
for recordation of security agreements through the filing of UCC-1
financing statements which are indexed by the debtor's name so that
a single filing can be used for the whole film library. Furthermore, a
UCC-1 filing can provide a continuing, floating lien on assets of a
particular type owned by the debtor without the need for periodic
updates (UCC section 9204). Thus, the creditor need only make
one filing, and the prospective purchaser need only search the indi-
ces for the debtor's name.
In view of the foregoing, it seems reasonable for a creditor to
opt for the UCC filing procedure when acquiring a security interest
in a library of film copyrights, a portfolio of computer program
copyrights, or any other large stable of copyrighted works. But, as
seen below, that practice would now be a mistake of enormous pro-
portions in light of a recent case, In re Peregrine Entertainment,
Ltd. 376
1. National Peregrine
In National Peregrine, Cap Fed had extended a $6 million line
376. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1017 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
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of credit to the predecessor of NPI secured by the predecessor's film
library consisting of copyrights and distribution rights and licenses
with respect to approximately 145 films, and accounts receivable
from the licensing thereof. Cap Fed filed UCC-1 financing state-
ments in order to perfect its security interest. NPI then became a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy debtor-in-possession whose principal assets
were the film library and the accounts receivable. NPI contended
that Cap Fed's security interest was unperfected because Cap Fed
failed to record the security interest in the United States Copyright
Office as provided for in 17 U.S.C. section 205(a) and that NPI had
a judicial lien on the film library and receivables and thus could
recover the assets for the benefit of the estate.
The district court agreed with NPI.37 The court began by
holding that an agreement granting a creditor a security interest in
a copyright or in income derived from commercial exploitation of a
copyright is a "document pertaining to a copyright [which] may be
recorded in the Copyright Office" under section 205(a). Therefore,
Cap Fed could have recorded the security agreement in the Copy-
right Office. The court next determined that recordation in the
Copyright Office under the Copyright Act was the exclusive recor-
dation method preempting "any state recordation system pertaining
to interests in copyrights" including recordation pursuant to the
UCC as was done by Cap Fed. According to the court, "the com-
prehensive scope of the federal Copyright Act's recording provi-
sions, along with the unique federal interests they implicate, support
the view that federal law preempts state methods of perfecting se-
curity interests in copyrights and related accounts receivable."
Having concluded that Cap Fed should have, but did not, rec-
ord its security interest with the Copyright Office, the court went on
to hold that NPI could subordinate Cap Fed's interest and recover
it for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.378
377. The court said that its decision would be the same whether the works were them-
selves created under the present Copyright Act or its predecessor because transfers of copy-
rights created under the predecessor Act are governed by the current Act's recording
provisions as long as the transfer was after the effective date of the 1976 Act.
378. The court also construed the UCC provisions themselves as requiring the use of the
Copyright Office recordation procedure for perfecting a security interest in a copyright to the
exclusion of the UCC procedure. In the context of copyrights, this holding is overshadowed
by the ruling that the state procedures are preempted which would be the case even if the
UCC provisions were amended to explicitly allow UCC-1 filings in lieu of Copyright Office
filings. But this ruling may have major impact in other areas, particularly, security interests
in patents.
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected the holdings in two patent cases "insofar as
they are germane to the issues presented here." Both cases held that, under the UCC, secur-
ity interests in patents need not be recorded in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
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Based on this decision, it is clear that one who is granted a
security interest in or pertaining to a copyright or revenue gener-
ated therefrom should record the security agreement in the Copy-
right Office pursuant to section 205. Remember that for a
recordation to be effective as against third parties, section 205(c)(2)
requires that the copyrighted work be registered in the Copyright
Office pursuant to sections 408 et seq. Therefore, be certain that the
work is registered or will be registered as part of the transaction
creating the security interest. But, one should not automatically ig-
nore the UCC recordation provisions. The Copyright Office proce-
dure is best used in addition to, and not in lieu of, the UCC process.
Other courts in and out of California may find the court's reasoning
in National Peregrine, Inc. flawed and its decision incorrect. Should
that be so, compliance with state law may be a prerequisite to crea-
tion and enforcement of rights against the debtor. Even if the case
stands the test of time, the Copyright Act's recordation and priority
scheme is not nearly as comprehensive as that of the UCC. Where
the former is silent as to a creditor's rights and remedies, the court
resolving the issues may, and indeed should, turn to the UCC and
state law in filling in the gaps. That would be wholly consistent
with the statement in National Peregrine, Inc. that, in the case of
patents, recordation pursuant to the patent statute may be necessary
to perfect a creditor's security interest, but the priority scheme es-
tablished by the UCC may govern because the patent statute is si-
lent on that issue.
F. Right To Jury Trial In A Copyright Infringement Action
A right to a jury trial exists in a copyright infringement suit on
the issues of infringement and willfulness when monetary damages
of any kind are sought, even if the only damages sought are statu-
tory damages.379
to be perfected as against lien creditors because section 261 of the federal patent statute (35
U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.) governing patent assignments does not specifically mention liens or lien
creditors. According to the National Peregrine, Inc. court, however, these cases misconstrue
the plain language of certain UCC provisions, which require that when a federal statute pro-
vides for a national system of recordation or specifies a place of filing different from that in
the UCC, compliance with the national system supplants and is deemed equivalent to the
filing ofa UCC-1 financing statement (UCC §§ 9104(a), 9302(4)). It may be that the priority
scheme established by the UCC (§ 9301) governs the conflicting rights of creditors (since the
patent statute is silent as to a priority scheme), but determination of whether a creditor's
interest is perfected depends on the creditor's recordation of its interest in accordance with
the federal statute (UCC § 9302(4)).
379. Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1013-17, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1753
(7th Cir. 1991).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The copyright laws as they apply to computer programs are in
a constant state of flux. Only a sampling of the changes in the law
over the last few years have been discussed in this article. There are
many, many others. That translates into an extremely exciting time
for those practicing software copyright law and, at the same time, a
terribly unsettling time for those actively engaged in the develop-
ment and marketing of software.
A software firm that believed ownership of its flagship program
to be beyond challenge might find that a former software consultant
has a legitimate claim of joint ownership in the program. The com-
pany might instead learn that its copyright in the program is invalid
and that the program is free for all to copy because its predecessor
intentionally omitted certain material information from the applica-
tion to register such copyright. The copyright may be unenforce-
able due to a licensing program adopted ten years ago, but which
now constitutes copyright misuse. The rigorous clean room proce-
dure used in developing the program may no longer be adequate to
shield the program from a claim of infringement thereby exposing
the company to millions of dollars in liability and an injunction
prohibiting further marketing of the program. The program may
have borrowed elements from an industry standard program at a
time when the conventional wisdom was that those elements were
unprotectible ideas, but recent cases rule that the elements are now
copyrightable expression. The company may have placed great reli-
ance on the protection afforded by its shrink wrap license agree-
ments only to later learn that such agreements are unenforceable.
The lesson to be learned from the above is clear. Everyone in
the software industry must be diligent in monitoring changes in the
copyright laws. With each change, policies and practices must be
reevaluated, and the strength and weaknesses of copyright posi-
tions, both offensive and defensive, reassessed. Only then can one
maximize the value of one's own copyrights, while minimizing the
risk that one's products will run afoul of the copyrights of others.
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